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Stranded Costs and Grid
Decarbonization
Emily Hammond† & Jim Rossi††
INTRODUCTION
Change is at the center of today’s debates regarding how
to transition to a low-carbon energy infrastructure. Achieving
an 80% reduction from 1990 carbon emission levels by the year
20501 will require increased renewables penetration,2 nearterm reliance on significant amounts of new natural gas power
generation,3 a potential major transition away from conventional
baseload power plants,4 significant investment in distributed
generation and new technologies,5 and increased focus on
demand-side measures.6 But given the industry’s immobile
Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.
Professor, Vanderbilt Law School.
1 This is roughly the level of emissions reduction necessary to meet the
commonly agreed upon goal in the international community of limiting the anthropogenic
increase in global mean surface temperatures to less than two degrees Celsius. See JAMES
H. WILLIAMS ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014),
http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/US-Deep-Decarbonization-Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F6JF-AUMX] [hereinafter PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION].
2 TRIEU MAI ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY
FUTURES STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 30 (M.M. Hand et al. eds., 2012), http://www.nrel.
gov/docs/fy13osti/52409-ES.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J6P-5M3M] (estimating electricity
demand could be met by 80% renewable sources by 2050).
3 Cf. STEVE WEISSMAN, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, NATURAL GAS AS A
BRIDGE FUEL: MEASURING THE BRIDGE 1 (2016), https://energycenter.org/sites/default/
files/docs/nav/policy/research-and-reports/Natural_Gas_Bridge_Fuel.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F2QH-NEXF] (noting near-term need but cautioning against long-term natural gas
reliance).
4 See LUCY JOHNSTON & RACHEL WILSON, STRATEGIES FOR DECARBONIZING
THE ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY 6–7 (2012), http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/05/rap-gpbp-decarbonizingpowersupply-2012-nov-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/T95Y-2
FD6] (noting that “more than 70 percent of [U.S.] coal-fired capacity is more than 30 years
old”). “Baseload” power plants are those that must run at or near their full capacity to meet
customer load, and typically include coal and nuclear plants, but not most natural gas or
renewable power generation resources.
5 See, e.g., Amy L. Stein, Distributed Reliability, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 887, 941–
61 (2016) (considering regulatory needs for incorporating distributed generation into grid
reliability policymaking); Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a
Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 751–65 (2014) (considering regulatory
needs for emerging technologies like energy storage).
6 See PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supra note 1, at 73.
†
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capital assets with financial and operational lives ranging from
fifty to eighty years in length, energy infrastructure can change
only at a slow pace. Path dependency threatens “carbon lockin,” which could thwart any successful transition to a low-carbon
energy system.7 To the extent that grid decarbonization adversely
affects the economic value of a significant portion of current
assets (such as older coal plants), some industry investors and
analysts have even raised concerns that the impending
disruptions of change could lead to financial distress, hardship,
and, at the extreme, catastrophe.8
Energy law can deal with such change. On many occasions
over the past half century, energy law has been forced to confront
the “stranded costs” of transitions—that is, the value of a
regulated firm’s investments left shipwrecked by changing
regulatory circumstances. From an accounting standpoint,
stranded costs are the difference between an asset’s book value—
including such things as power generating equipment—and its
market value.9 As discussed in greater detail below, stranded
7

As Gregory Unruh describes:

[I]ndustrial economies have been locked into fossil fuel-based energy systems
through a process of technological and institutional co-evolution driven by
path-dependent increasing returns to scale. It is asserted that this condition,
termed carbon lock-in, creates persistent market and policy failures that can
inhibit the diffusion of carbon-saving technologies despite their apparent
environmental and economic advantages.
Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 817, 817 (2000).
8 See, e.g., Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition
Mean a Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (2014); DELOITTE CTR.
FOR ENERGY SOLS, THE NEW MATH: SOLVING THE EQUATION FOR DISRUPTION TO THE
U.S. ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 1–8 (2014), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/
Deloitte/us/Documents/energy-resources/us-energyandresources-the-new-math.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5CYL-PY6E]; PETER KIND, EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES:
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC
BUSINESS 19 (2013), http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.
pdf [https://perma.cc/D9N3-AC24]; see also Alex Morales, ‘Stranded Assets’: Will Efforts to
Counter Warming Render Energy Reserves Worthless?, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/stranded-assets-will-efforts-to-counter-warming-renderenergy-reserves-worthless/2014/12/05/ecbc73a6-7a45-11e4-9a27-6fdbc612bff8_story.html
[https://perma.cc/87P5-QPZT] (describing a similar threat to the fossil fuel industry more
generally). To underscore the significance of stranding impacts of the impending transition,
one study envisions that the global stranded-cost impact of the impending transition is in
the range of $25 trillion for the entire energy sector. See DAVID NELSON ET AL., CLIMATE
POLICY INITIATIVE, MOVING TO LOW-CARBON ECONOMY: THE IMPACT OF POLICY
PATHWAYS ON FOSSIL FUEL ASSET VALUES, at IV, 12–13 (2014), http://climatepolicy
initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Moving-to-a-Low-Carbon-Economy-The-Impactsof-Policy-Pathways-on-Fossil-Fuel-Asset-Values.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA37-PWXK].
9 Charles G. Stalon, Consultant on Energy Regulation, Presentation for the
Electric Industry in Transition Conference Session on What Are the Transition Costs to a
More Competitive Market and Who Should Pay?: Stranded Investment Costs: Desirable
and Less Desirable Solutions 2 (June 15, 1994), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/
Papers/Stalon_Stranded_Costs_0694.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QGK-N44Z].
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costs are those investments that a utility has incurred to meet its
obligation to serve customers with an expectation of cost recovery
through rates, but which can no longer be recovered due to a change
in the industry.10 This article’s initial working definition of stranded
costs is simple: Existing energy infrastructure that retains some
useful life, but that can no longer generate initially expected revenue
due to regulatory shifts, market forces, or innovation. In addition,
this article emphasizes that in the transition to decarbonization, the
stranded cost issue will be just as significant for new investments in
energy resources as it is for existing infrastructure.
This article maintains that energy regulators’ traditional
approach to stranded cost compensation for existing resources
during industry transitions suffers from myopia and must be
reformed to address the transition to decarbonization. The
traditional notion of stranded costs is rooted in an understanding
of regulation known as the “regulatory compact (or contract),”11
under which the utility takes on an obligation to serve customers
and, in return, is guaranteed an opportunity to recover the costs
of its investments. This approach worked for decades to provide
some degree of certainty to investors, though its flaws are also
well known.12 In addressing new stranded cost challenges and
opportunities, energy law can best facilitate a balance between
promoting investor certainty and providing flexibility by being
proactive, recognizing that past approaches to stranded cost
recovery could just as easily thwart as facilitate decarbonization.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I argues that
stranded cost recovery mechanisms over the past fifty years have
fixated on honoring the “deal” of the regulatory contract for
incumbent firms and their investors. Furthermore, regulators
have seriously grappled with transition costs issues only after a
change in conditions has occurred. Each time a new energy
transition takes place, energy regulators have provided for
significant stranded cost compensation, though it is not always
clear that the manner in which they did so provided sound
investment signals for the energy system. Moreover, stranded
10 William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded Costs, 18 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 835, 835 (1995).
11 See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring) (referencing the term).
12 Particularly salient examples include the numerous canceled nuclear and
coal-fired power plants in the 1980s and the major shifts associated with moving to
competitive electricity markets. See, e.g., John Burritt McArthur, Cost Responsibility or
Regulatory Indulgence for Electricity’s Stranded Costs?, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 779–80
(1998) (electricity restructuring); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of
Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497,
497 (1984) (coal and nuclear). See infra Section I.A for further discussion.
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cost recovery has often stood in the way of change, failing to
sufficiently address the “stranded benefits” of new transitions13
or the broader social values advanced by industry transitions. In
large part, this has happened because stranded cost recovery
has been addressed only ex post, when a fixation on losses to a
firm’s existing investments drives the discussion. This article
maintains that this stranded cost myopia has distorted some
necessary investment signals, magnified an excess capacity
problem with some baseload power generators, thwarted new
entrants, and prolonged the energy sector’s dependency on
existing energy infrastructure, including many fossil fuel plants.
Part II turns to the energy sector’s transition to
decarbonization. This transition to a new, low-carbon normal
challenges every part of this sector, including resource extraction,
power generation, transmission, and distribution. Given
regulators’ past appetite for stranded cost compensation, one can
expect incumbent firms to raise new calls for stranded cost
compensation each time a new change is proposed.14 Even now,
several coal companies have already filed for bankruptcy, some
nuclear power plants are at risk for early closure, and local
utilities are fighting rooftop solar incentives such as net
metering.15 At the same time, policymakers and industry
representatives often speak of natural gas, and, increasingly,
nuclear power, as bridge fuels that will facilitate the transition to
a low-carbon future.16 The simple reality is that energy regulation
is not particularly adept at “temporary”—and once approved,
incumbent firms expect their assets to stay in operation and
produce revenue as long as they can convince regulators to allow
13 “Stranded benefits” are those off-setting benefits that transitions can
create for firms in an industry or their investors. See infra Section I.B.2.
14 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pig in the Python: Is
Lumpy Capacity Investment Used and Useful?, 23 ENERGY L.J. 383, 395–98 (2002); Jim
Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law, 98 NW.
U. L. REV. 1617, 1699–70 (2004) (reviewing GOSE A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATING
INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION (2003)).
15 See Richard Martin, Battles over Net Metering Cloud the Future of Rooftop
Solar, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/545146/
battles-over-net-metering-cloud-the-future-of-rooftop-solar/ [https://perma.cc/6WG7-JPM
N] (describing several such challenges).
16 WEISSMAN, supra note 3, at 1; see also Order Adopting a Clean Energy
Standard at 1, Nos. 15-E-0302, 16-E-0270 (N.Y. P.U.C. Aug. 1, 2016) (listing among the
purposes of the new clean energy standard “to preserve existing zero-emissions nuclear
generation resources as a bridge to the clean energy future”). New York has approved a
Clean Energy Standard that, among other things, seeks to maintain its nuclear fleet as
the state transitions to 50% non-emitting electricity by the year 2030. See Denise Grab &
Burcin Unel, New York’s Clean Energy Standard Is a Key Step Toward Pricing Carbon
Pollution Fairly, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/new-yorksclean-energy-standard-is-a-key-step-toward-pricing-carbon-pollut/424741/ [https://perma.
cc/CAN6-UE6A].
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it. At the very minimum, if left unaddressed, these stranded cost
issues threaten to delay the transition to decarbonization.
As Part III discusses, the transition to decarbonization
requires regulators to address stranded costs, though to avoid
carbon lock-in they must apply similar principles to both new
and old energy infrastructure. Even so, as Part III also
discusses, treating old and new assets neutrally does not
necessarily mean the end of stranded cost recovery with a
transition toward decarbonization. Instead, stranded cost issues
will remain as important as ever, albeit with a new focus.
Investors will continue to seek some commitment from the
regulatory process before moving forward,17 and each successive
capital investment decision in new energy infrastructure will
represent an irreversible choice for decades into the future. But
these concerns need not necessitate a wholesale reconstruction
of energy law. Rather, we think that the transition to a postcarbon energy sector presents regulators with an opportunity to
draw from some of energy law’s traditional tools to better
approach risk compensation—encouraging a more adaptive and
flexible grid than in the past, while also attracting new
investment by addressing stranded costs proactively in ways
that recognize both market and nonmarket values.
Moving forward, a presumption or expectation in favor of
stranded cost compensation based on past experience could be
counterproductive, delaying and frustrating to the transition
toward decarbonization. But realistically, some stranded cost
compensation will be essential to the decarbonization transition.
If approached in a careful manner, stranded cost recovery can
facilitate the transition toward decarbonization by encouraging
investors and firms to better price the core market and
nonmarket attributes of energy resources. To do so, regulators
need to pay attention to the timing of cost allocation, avoiding
the temptation to address stranded costs only at the back end of
the carbon transition. For example, as discussed in more detail
below, regulators making decisions regarding major new
infrastructure projects like pipelines and transmission lines
should be attentive to stranded cost issues before approving
projects, instead of waiting to address stranded costs only after
change has occurred.18

17 Eliminating such commitments altogether would likely drive up the overall
cost of capital for regulated utilities. See Emily Hammond & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Clean Power Plan: Testing the Limits of Administrative Law and the Electric Grid, 7
GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (2016).
18 See infra Section III.B.1.
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Regulators providing for stranded cost recovery must
also be attentive to social values that are not currently priced
in energy markets. Changes associated with decarbonization
present a particularly propitious opportunity for regulators to
address important values such as reliability and carbon impacts
of various energy resources in stranded cost compensation,
especially where the competitive energy markets fail to price
these features of energy resources.19 This article proposes some
ways for stranded cost recovery to better recognize these positive
benefits associated with regulatory transitions for new energy
resources, without conflicting with federal energy market policy.
Reforms that address regulatory risk through early
stranded cost recovery will inevitably come at some cost to
consumers in the near term, yet a return on investment is
imperative to attracting capital for new infrastructure that will
facilitate a balanced portfolio of energy resources for a
decarbonized grid.20 If stranded costs for both new and old
resources are addressed with similar principles in mind, the net
effect should be to reduce the overall cost of capital investments
necessary for a decarbonized energy system.
I.

ENERGY LAW’S STRANDED COST HISTORY

Over the past half century, the energy sector has
undergone some remarkable transformations. The regulatory
contract that has predominated energy law’s history envisions a
utility taking on customer service obligations in exchange for a
guarantee that its investors will be compensated for risk.21 Even
with traditional rate regulation, changing economic conditions,
technological obsolescence, and unexpected shifts in regulatory
approach have presented a threat to investors in energy firms.22
Specifically, investors have faced the risk that an energy utility’s
investments would be rendered stranded as a result of
transitions. If energy law cannot find ways to compensate
investors for stranded costs, this will adversely affect the overall

19 For discussion of the general issue, see Emily Hammond & David B. Spence,
The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 192–214 (2016).
20 Low returns available to investors are often seen as a barrier to attracting
the investment necessary to decarbonize the electric power sector. See, e.g., WORLD ECON.
FORUM, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY: ATTRACTING INVESTMENT TO BUILD TOMORROW’S
ELECTRICITY SECTOR 7 (2015), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFUSA_FutureOf
Electricity_Report2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL87-7LJN].
21 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 149–51 (describing traditional
regulation).
22 E.g., Pierce, supra note 12, at 500.
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cost of capital for new infrastructure, requiring firms to incur
higher interest rates to attract debt and equity investors.
Over the past half century, the energy industry has
undergone three significant stranded cost experiments:
disallowance of construction costs for canceled nuclear power
plants in the 1980s;23 “take-or-pay” natural gas supply contracts
associated with gas pipeline open access;24 and stranded power
generation assets associated with the transition to competitive
electric power markets.25 As described in more detail below, in
each of these scenarios, significant amounts of economic capital
were threatened by transition. As each transition took place,
energy investors (and utilities) made forecasts of major economic
loss and, at the extreme, financial catastrophe. In most instances,
regulators drew on tools (often with controversy) to mitigate
adverse financial impacts associated with the impending
transition. By deferring any focus on compensating investors for
the risks of change to the future, regulators in the past were able
to keep the cost of new capital for energy firms low—although
once change was imminent, the focus shifted to stranded cost
compensation as a way to address these risks ex post.
Despite some industry prognostications, the sky never did
fall with past energy industry transitions. But that also does not
mean that stranded cost compensation always produced good
results. In the past, regulators consistently favored stranded cost
compensation ex post—that is, after projects (and their expected
investments costs) had been approved, and sometimes decades
after assets had been constructed and used to produce and deliver
energy. By only really addressing the issue of stranded costs after
initial investment decisions have been made, many regulators
based stranded cost calculations on perceived investor losses
related to a large-scale, already-approved capital asset. This ex
post environment for determining stranded costs invited industry
stakeholders to present regulators with grossly exaggerated
claims of the adverse impact of a transition on the firm’s investors
and to present little or no evidence of how a change would
produce benefits for the firm or others. This approach to stranded
cost compensation may have assuaged regulators, firms, and their
23 Though less frequently mentioned, this issue extended to coal-fired plants as
well. See id. at 498–99 (documenting both nuclear and coal-fired plant cancellations).
24 E.g., Hollye C. Doane, Take-Or-Pay: FERC’s Regulatory Dilemma, 2 SPRING
NAT. RES. & ENV’T 18, 18 (1987) (“No other issue in the history of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has caused such paralysis . . . .”).
25 See Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory
Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1768, 1778–79 & n.25 (2002) (describing stranded cost recovery associated
with California deregulation and collecting criticisms).
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investors, but it resulted in myopia that exaggerated stranded
costs losses to investors, delayed regulatory change, and
ignored any broader assessment of the social costs and benefits
associated with transitioning. Regulators determining stranded
costs in this manner did a poor job of separating the common
economic and technological risks that any business investor
would expect, from regulatory risks over which firms have little
or no control.
A.

Past Stranded Cost Experiments

As should be evident, discussions of stranded costs in the
energy industry are hardly new. Threats to investor expectations
due to new technologies or changing economic conditions have a
long legacy in regulated industries. For example, the impact of
new technologies and new market entrants was at the core of the
dispute of the landmark Charles River Bridge case, which
clarified principles surrounding monopoly and innovation prior to
industrial development.26 In deciding that important case 180
years ago, the Supreme Court endorsed the principle that a
monopoly’s charter should be interpreted narrowly to favor new
entrants.27 Yet stranded cost compensation experiments over the
past fifty years in the energy industry seem to run against the
grain of this longstanding principle, with regulators consistently
finding ways to ensure that investor-backed expectations are not
upset by industry changes.28 As these experiments show, instead
of being wary of stranded costs, regulators have shown a
considerable appetite for compensating investors post hoc,
routinely approving customer charges designed to guarantee an
incumbent energy utility one hundred percent compensation for
stranded costs during regulatory, economic, and technological
transitions in the energy sector.29
1. Excess Capacity and Canceled Nuclear Power Plants
One high-profile stranded cost issue was associated with
new nuclear power plants—many of which were canceled midconstruction—and the subsequent disallowance of cost recovery

26 Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge,
36 U.S. 420 (1837).
27 Id. For a general discussion of the history of the case, see STANLEY I. KUTLER,
PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971).
28 See infra Sections I.A.1–3.
29 See infra Sections I.A.1–3.
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by regulatory commissions in the 1970s and ‘80s.30 In the late
1960s and early 1970s, nuclear power looked like a prudent
investment: electricity demand was projected to sharply increase,
and nuclear power (and coal) appeared to be a far better
investment than oil- and gas-fired plants.31 Not only was nuclear
power projected to be less costly to operate, but natural gas was in
very short supply, and the United States had national security
concerns about relying on foreign oil.32 But by the late 1970s and
into the 1980s, things changed. Demand did not increase as
expected, Three Mile Island prompted concerns about the safety
of nuclear power, and both world oil and the domestic natural gas
markets underwent substantial price reductions.33 Utilities were
left holding excess generating capacity, and it became clear that
newer power generation technologies could produce power more
cheaply than nuclear plants.34 Over 120 partially constructed
plants were canceled, and the question of how to address the
resulting stranded costs loomed large.35
In the end, many of these plants received full or at least
partial cost recovery. As Richard Pierce describes it, the policy
effect of the regulatory response was to provide many private
utilities compensation for what, in retrospect, were considered
mistakes—perhaps in part because the regulatory process
encouraged investment in large baseload power generation
plants.36 Forcing the utilities to bear the full costs of cancellations
would have ignored this regulatory relationship and, moreover,
would have served to increase the overall cost of capital
associated with these investments, perhaps putting the utility out
of business.37 On the other hand, allowing full cost recovery for
every loss a firm incurred due to investment decisions that were
mistakes in retrospect would have unfairly burdened customers.
Thus, it would have been politically untenable and would have
significantly diverged from how a competitive market would
approach investment risks.38

30 See EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIAL 400–02 (4th ed. 2015) (describing changes in the nuclear energy sector over
time).
31 Pierce, supra note 12, at 500–01.
32 Id.
33 EISEN ET AL., supra note 30, at 400–02.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 401.
36 See Pierce, supra note 12, at 499.
37 See Legislative Util. Consumers’ Council v. Pub. Serv. Co., 402 A.2d 626, 629
(N.H. 1979) (describing financial struggles of utility undertaking nuclear power plant
construction).
38 Pierce, supra note 12, at 506.
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Some jurisdictions famously did not allow for stranded
cost recovery at all. In the landmark decision Duquesne Light Co.
v. Barasch,39 for example, the Supreme Court rejected a Takings
Clause challenge brought by the owners of canceled nuclear
power plants that had been denied cost recovery for investments
that had been deemed prudent when they were initially made.40
More often, however, state commissions allowed nuclear power
companies to recover from customers at least some of their
stranded costs, whether these were attributed to excess capacity
or for canceled plants.41 And a few plants under construction
during this time were permitted to recover from customers for
construction works in progress (CWIP), representing regulators’
recognition of the uncertain economic and regulatory
environment for new nuclear plants and the need for substantial
lines of credit early in the construction phase.42
Significantly, canceled nuclear plants were not a
transition cost that regulators or investors had accurately
predicted at the time they approved the plants in the first
place. Rather, these stranded cost recovery decisions were
routinely made after plants had undergone “prudence” review
(the reasonableness review rate regulators apply to new
investments) and were approved for construction. Still, routine
ex post stranded cost recovery, independent of the initial
decision of the firm (and its investors) to incur the costs of
nuclear power generation facilities, could have an undeniable
impact on the cost of capital and investment decisions. If at the
time of making investment decisions, investors routinely
expected this kind of ex post compensation (perhaps the
regulatory contract encouraged them to do so), the initial cost
488 U.S. 299 (1989).
Id. at 302–03. Though the Court was not receptive to the utilities’ claim
that the Constitution requires stranded cost recovery for canceled nuclear plants, it
also did not dismiss the idea that the Constitution provides a floor to protect investorbased expectations. Id. at 310. At the extreme, the Court noted, a rate still could be so
low that it is confiscatory, especially if a firm is not allowed to compensate its investors
at all for the financial risks that they incur. Id. at 314–15 (“[R]eturn to the equity
owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises
having corresponding risks.” (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944))). In addition, a regulator cannot
“arbitrarily switch back and forth between methodologies in a way which required
investors to bear the risk of bad investments at some times while denying them the
benefit of good investments at others.” Id. at 315.
41 See generally Pierce, supra note 12 (detailing examples of such cases).
42 E.g., Legislative Util. Consumers’ Council v. Pub. Serv. Co., 402 A.2d 626,
629, 641 (N.H. 1979) (upholding state commission’s authority to allow construction
funds for Seabrook nuclear plant to be recovered in CWIP); cf. Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1185–86 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(noting that FERC might permissibly allow utilities to include some unamortized costs
of canceled plants in rate base).
39

40
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of capital for a regulated utility would be lower than that of a
competitive firm. To the extent this was the case, utility
regulators (and the regulatory contract) effectively insured the
risk of change for private investors. Against the backdrop of
rate regulation, this artificially low cost of capital could have
encouraged overinvestment in large baseload plants,
contributing even further to excess capacity. On the other hand,
if no compensation for harms caused by the regulatory change
were expected by investors ex ante (i.e., at the time of the initial
investment in the firm), investors would demand a risk premium
(and a higher return on investment) to insure themselves against
the possibility of change. So without stranded cost recovery, the
firm’s cost of capital would need to be priced higher to reflect this
risk. A higher cost of capital would have discouraged new
investments in these assets, given that regulators were attentive
to the cost of capital in approving new investments and setting
utility rates. So allowing for stranded cost recovery provided
regulators a delicate way of balancing a need for investor
certainty to attract capital with their need to keep the cost of
capital for new infrastructure as low as possible, minimizing
immediate impacts of new infrastructure on customer rates.
2. Natural Gas Pipelines and Take-Or-Pay Contracts
A second stranded cost recovery experiment from the
past half century is associated with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) implementation of open access
in natural gas pipelines to encourage competition in interstate
gas supply markets. Congress began restructuring the natural
gas industry in the late 1980s by unbundling gas sales from
pipeline transportation services and providing equal access to
the latter.43 This approach recognized that traditional gas
regulation’s approach to setting a single rate for pipeline gas had
failed to see that there are two or more distinct markets bundled
together, only one of which is a natural monopoly (i.e., the
“pipes”). FERC set out to “unbundle” these distinct markets,
implementing an “open access” regulatory scheme that applies
only to the natural monopoly market so that all producers have
access to the pipelines on similar terms to ship their gas to the
buyer who offers them the best deal.44
43 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas
Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1988) (discussing natural gas
industry restructuring).
44 Id. at 24–27.
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However, pipelines’ stranded costs presented a barrier to
the transition to this new competitive market.45 To support
pipeline construction and operation, many pipelines had
committed billions of dollars in long-term “take-or-pay” contracts
at very high prices. These contracts obligated pipelines to pay
their suppliers, even when pipelines could not take the gas.46 In
initially addressing the transition to pipeline deregulation, FERC
refused to grant pipeline requests for take-or-pay relief.47 FERC’s
Order 436,48 described by the D.C. Circuit as a “complete
restructuring” of the industry,49 did not provide for any take-orpay compensation because pipelines were successfully negotiating
themselves out of these obligations without FERC’s assistance.50
But the D.C. Circuit vacated that aspect of Order 436, accusing
FERC of “blindness” to the impacts of open access on pipelines, as
well as a “tendency to elevate into affirmative benefits what are
at best palliatives.”51 Without meaningful take-or-pay contract
relief, the D.C. Circuit likened the voluntary open access option
FERC had provided pipelines to “the choice between the noose
and the firing squad.”52 When FERC continued to refuse any
compensation for take-or-pay contracts on remand, the D.C.
Circuit again rejected the agency’s approach, charging FERC with
attempting to delay indefinitely until the issue went away.53
FERC addressed the issue in Order 500, which
adopted an equitable splitting of take-or-pay costs.54 As
FERC stated there:
The Commission recognizes that it is difficult to assign blame for
the pipeline industry’s take-or-pay problems. In brief, no one
segment of the natural gas industry or particular circumstance
appears wholly responsible for the pipelines’ excess inventories of
gas. As a result, all segments should shoulder some of the burden
of resolving the problem.55

45 For discussion, see Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Clifford S. Sikora, Open Access
and Transition Costs: Will the Electric Industry Transition Track the Natural Gas
Industry Restructuring?, 25 ENERGY L.J. 113, 139–43 (2004).
46 For an overview, see EISEN ET AL., supra note 30, at 551–54.
47 Order 380, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778, 22,787 (1984).
48 Order 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985).
49 Associated Gas Distribs. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 824 F.2d 981,
993 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
50 Id. at 1023.
51 Id. at 1025.
52 Id. at 1024.
53 Am. Gas Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 888 F.2d 136, 148 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
54 Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol
(Order 500), 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (Aug. 7, 1987).
55 Id. at 30,337.
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In Order 500, FERC still failed to endorse full recovery of
pipeline stranded costs, perhaps because the very existence of
these take-or-pay contracts indicated that pipelines were aware
of some risks of changing economic conditions. In Order 636,
which completed FERC’s gas pipeline restructuring, FERC
finally allowed pipelines to bill customers for one hundred
percent of their remaining stranded costs,56 though the agency
was also careful to note that the equitable sharing approach of the
past (as endorsed by Order 500) had been necessary to “encourage
pipelines to share some of the cost of the extraordinary take-orpay liabilities of the early and mid-1980’s.”57 Although the D.C.
Circuit had made it clear that FERC could not completely ignore
the impact on investors of take-or-pay contracts during pipeline
market restructuring, it bears emphasis that the agency was
never legally obligated to provide one hundred percent recovery
for stranded costs associated with transitioning from regulated to
competitive gas markets—even though Order 636 ultimately took
this policy position.
The nature of the stranded costs incurred by pipelines
during this transition differed from nuclear stranded costs. Fuel
costs are a relatively small component of the costs of operating a
nuclear power plant, so nuclear stranded cost compensation
debates were driven by the fixed costs of the assets.58 By contrast,
given how pipeline contracts were executed in the industry,
pipelines’ claims to stranded costs were driven almost entirely by
the volatility in gas markets.59 The use of stranded cost recovery
to compensate firms for this risk made it even more difficult for
regulators to assess which risks were appropriate for investors, on
the one hand, and consumers, on the other. Still, as with nuclear
power plants, stranded cost recovery for take-or-pay contracts was
approved post hoc, after these contracts were executed, so this
was not a risk that pipeline investors were presumably
compensated for in their initial return on investment. Ex post
stranded cost recovery helped to keep the cost of capital for
approved pipeline projects low, while also providing investors
compensation for risks of change as they materialized, rather
than in a higher return on their initial investment.

56 Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing SelfImplementing Transportation; and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial
Wellhead Control (Order 636), 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267, 13,281, 13,307 (Apr. 8, 1992).
57 Id. at 13,308.
58 See Pierce, supra note 12, at 497–98 (detailing cost recovery claims).
59 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 30, at 551–54 (detailing stranded cost issues
for pipelines).
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3. Competitive Restructuring of the Electric Power
Industry
A third and more recent experiment with stranded cost
recovery relates to the competitive restructuring of the electric
power industry in the 1990s. For most of the twentieth century,
the electric utility had been regulated as a natural monopoly,
but a range of reforms in the 1970s and ‘80s led to efforts to
restructure the industry toward competitive markets, much in
the manner that FERC had reformed natural gas markets.60
This transition revived concern about constitutional
takings of the sort that pepper the history of energy law,61
repackaged for this particular set of events as “deregulatory
takings.”62 These stranded cost claims included requests to allow
regulatory compensation for some power plant assets that were
no longer considered valuable in competitive power markets, in a
similar manner to canceled nuclear plants.63 However, many
firms’ claims to stranded costs from electric power restructuring
also related to lost expected income given the change in
regulatory rules. Just as with gas pipeline stranded cost
compensation, this kind of focus on income streams stranded by
regulatory transition challenged the ability of regulators to
separate ordinary business risks over which the firm (and its
investors) have some degree of control, from regulatory risks
associated with the transition to competitive electric power
markets.64 Estimates of utilities’ stranded costs in the transition
to competitive electric power markets ranged from $10 billion to
$500 billion, with most estimates falling in the $100 billion to
$200 billion range.65
As with nuclear power plants’ stranded cost recovery,
courts were not receptive to legal claims that the Constitution
required full compensation for all revenue lost during a
60 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of the Transition to Competitive
Markets in Natural Gas and Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323 (1994) (comparing the
transitions to competition in natural gas and electric power).
61 E.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1989) (takings
challenge regarding cost recovery for canceled nuclear power plants); Fed. Power Comm’n
v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (takings challenge for method of computing
cost recovery).
62 J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT, at xiii (1997).
63 See generally id.
64 Cf. Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297, 307
(1998) (reviewing J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND
THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK
INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997)).
65 CONG. BUDGET OFF., ELECTRIC UTILITIES: DEREGULATION AND STRANDED
COSTS 15 (1998).
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transition to a competitive electricity market.66 However, despite
a lack of any judicial mandate to provide for full stranded cost
compensation, regulators routinely found ways to help mitigate
the stranded cost impacts on firms and investors of the regulatory
transition to competitive markets. In Order 888, issued in 1996,
FERC adopted an open access regime for wholesale electric power
supply, similar to its competitive market approach for natural
gas.67 In contrast to FERC’s initial shared cost allocation for takeor-pay contracts,68 FERC allowed utility shareholders to recover
one hundred percent of the stranded costs associated with
transitioning to a competitive wholesale power supply industry.69
In adopting retail competition plans, states such as California
also allowed for full stranded cost recovery.70 Importantly,
however, some states transitioning to competitive retail power
markets refused to allow for the full recovery of stranded costs or
denied them altogether.71
B.

Stranded Cost Myopia

These past experiments with stranded cost recovery and
the tools used by regulators to address them share some common
characteristics that contributed to a blinkered regulatory
perspective, distorting the cost of capital to consistently favor old
energy infrastructure over new entrants and new projects.
Importantly, they were not driven by judicial mandate72 so
much as by political and regulatory processes that invited
utilities (and their investors) to invest resources in lobbying for
compensation for the stranded costs associated with industry
changes, typically in the form of additional charges that
customers would pay in their future bills. While this approach
to stranded cost compensation was designed to ensure that the
66 John Burritt McArthur, The Irreconcilable Differences Between FERC’s
Natural Gas and Electricity Stranded Cost Treatments, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 71, 104–06
(1998); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86
VA. L. REV. 1435, 1457–68 (2000).
67 Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996).
68 McArthur, supra note 66, at 73–76.
69 Id. at 83, 93.
70 See infra note 71.
71 California allowed for one hundred percent stranded cost recovery in its
retail market transition; other states, by contrast, provided for only partial stranded
cost recovery or were outright hostile to stranded cost recovery claims, forcing firms to
take the initiative in selling off uneconomic assets. See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Denial of
Regulatory Assistance in Stranded Cost Recovery in a Deregulated Electricity Industry,
32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 431, 442–43 (1999).
72 See Rossi, supra note 64, at 306–07 (noting that since Market Street Railway
v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548 (1945), “courts have consistently imposed on
regulated firms the risk of changing technological and economic circumstances”).
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firm would be able to continue to attract capital at a low cost to
customers, it also served to lock in the status quo, resulting in
delays in industry transitions, including slowing the onset of
new technologies.73 The narrowly focused nature of these past
experiments involved both the timing of stranded cost recovery
and a regulatory lack of appreciation for values beyond the
immediate adverse financial impact of transitions on investors.
1. Ex Post Recovery Mechanisms
As described above, a common feature of these past
experiments with stranded cost compensation is an appetite, on
the part of both regulators and firms, for transition cost
recovery at the back end of investment decisions. These past
examples do not illustrate a regulatory process that makes a
concerted effort to address stranded costs before investment
decisions are made or at the time of their initial approval.
Hindsight is always 20/20, so such ex post recovery of stranded
costs serves to avert acknowledgment of any past mistakes on
the part of regulators or firms. On the other hand, providing
compensation for investment decisions gone wrong only ex post
can look more like a form of industry bailout than traditional
cost-based decision making, which would encourage actors to
price any risk of change into their initial investment decisions.
These experiments show that stranded cost compensation
helped to routinely ensure that investor risks were not ignored.
As described above, however, this practice could contribute to an
artificially low initial cost of capital for new investments. If
regulators themselves were ensuring against regulatory change,
investors (and the firm) had no incentive to demand a return on
investment that prices the risks of regulatory change in present
value as new infrastructure investment decisions were made. As
Richard Pierce has chronicled, for example, with respect to the
stranded cost problems associated with excess nuclear capacity,
the regulatory tools used to address those problems exacerbated
them, arguably encouraging rate-regulated utilities to overinvest
in certain forms of power supply.74
73 This, of course, was one of the concerns famously raised by the Proprietors of
the Charles River Bridge and rejected by Chief Justice Taney’s majority, which reasoned
that the loss of profit from the construction of a new bridge was simply irrelevant to
determining the state’s contractual obligations surrounding a monopoly charter, especially
where the public stood to benefit from new technology. Proprietors of the Charles River
Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 544 (1837) (noting “any ambiguity
in the terms of the [regulatory] contract, must operate against [the private company], and in
favor of the public”).
74 Pierce, supra note 12, at 506.
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At the same time, energy law’s historic appetite for backend cost recovery with changing circumstances systematically
encouraged firms to lobby against regulatory change and, once
changed seemed imminent, to make inflated claims for stranded
cost recovery. To take one example, with the impending
competitive restructuring of the electric power industry, the
industry claimed that stranded costs would be in the hundreds
of billions75 and that restructuring would potentially force
many utilities into bankruptcy. Not every firm made
substantial profits in the transition to competitive markets, but
today it is recognized that the actual stranded costs incurred by
firms were far less—closer to $10 billion—even though early
estimates and the regulatory and legislative process provided for
transition recovery in excess of $100 billion.76 Addressing
stranded costs after an investment decision is more likely to lead
to systematic overcompensation for regulatory risk because of
loss aversion, or the exaggerated value a firm (especially a
regulated firm with long-lived, capital-intensive assets) might
place on losing revenue streams they have received in the past.77
Out of fear of seeing their past investments lose existing
revenue, many energy firms and their investors routinely
overstated their stranded cost losses.78 Regulators too feared
criticism for past decisions they made, and therefore were often
complicit in approving stranded cost recovery for energy
infrastructure that they approved or encouraged. The expectation
that regulators would provide a back-end bailout—as happened
with excess nuclear capacity, take-or-pay contracts, and
competitive restructuring—encouraged firms to aggressively use
the regulatory process to prolong the revenue streams associated
with their assets.79
These experiments with stranded cost recovery also show
how energy regulators routinely confused different kinds of risk
See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 65, at 15.
Compare Lori A. Burkhart, Moody’s Frowns at Stranded Costs, PUB. UTIL.
FORT. (Oct. 1, 1995), https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/1995/10/moodys-frownsstranded-costs [https://perma.cc/2SXV-DRG4] (noting that Moody’s Investors Services
estimates that “[t]he most likely scenario [with electric power restructuring] would produce
$135 billion in stranded costs” and threaten the creditworthiness of utilities, with a
possibility of as much as $500 billion in stranded costs), with Ola Kinnander, Public Power:
New Moody’s Study May Lead to More Muni Utility Downgrades, BOND BUYER, Nov. 3, 1999
(noting that a new Moody’s study adjusted stranded cost estimates downward to $10 billion,
in part because of rising energy and capacity prices and legislative compensation that
softened actual stranded costs over a period of fewer than five years).
77 Eyal Zamir, Law’s Loss Aversion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW ch. 11 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014).
78 See id.
79 See Rossi, supra note 64, at 316.
75

76
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in compensating firms for stranded costs. Risks of economic and
technological change were frequently lumped together in
discussions of stranded cost recovery, perhaps because the
expectation of recovery alleviated any need for fine-tuning. As
stranded cost compensation shifted from focusing on a specific
capital asset (as with nuclear power plants) to focusing on
broader investor expectations about issues that were tied to
things such as long-term contracts and fuel costs, regulatory
risks (over which presumably firms and their investors had little
or no control) became muddled with ordinary business risks,
over which firms and their investors had some degree of control.
The result may have been to encourage a moral hazard problem
of sorts, leading to overinvestment in energy infrastructure and
more excess capacity: Utility investors could expect some
compensation at the back-end not only for risks of regulatory
change, but also for routine business risks associated with
changes in economic and technological conditions.80
2. Stranded Values of Past Stranded Cost Recovery
In addition to contributing to excess capacity and
discouraging private pricing of risk, energy law’s past
experiments with stranded cost recovery did a poor job of
recognizing the private and social gains associated with
transitions. A fixation on the regulatory contract focused
primarily on harms related to financial impacts to the firm and its
investors. Regulators gave little consideration to “stranded
benefits,” that is, the offsetting advantages that a transition
might also present to those firms or investors that were claiming
harm.81 For example, in the transition to competitive electric
power markets, after restructuring, many utilities retained
transmission lines that would become valuable new profit
centers in their future operations.82 Another such benefit is the
value older baseload power plants might provide as a reliability
and price hedge when competitive electric power markets
presented new volatilities. Such benefits were often ignored or
downplayed in stranded cost debates. Indeed, there is some
evidence to suggest that firms held back on disclosing their
See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 66, at 1486–89.
See Reed W. Cearley & Daniel H. Cole, Stranded Benefits Versus Stranded
Costs in Utility Deregulation, in 7 THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND
COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds.,
2003) (defining stranded benefits as a transfer from ratepayers to investors, as opposed to
investors to ratepayers).
82 See Rossi, supra note 64, at 313 (suggesting transmission and distribution
assets as stranded benefits).
80

81
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plans to exploit new opportunities with deregulation (and hence
any stranded benefits) until regulators had resolved stranded
cost compensation.83
Moreover, past stranded cost experiments made almost
no mention of the broader social costs and benefits associated
with a regulatory transition, or its impact on the energy system.
Regulators’ focus on compensating firm-specific investor value
provided for little serious consideration of the social costs
associated with industry transitions. An emphasis on the
financial impact of stranded investments to investors left little
room for regulators to address other values like energy
reliability or the environmental attributes of energy resources.
Little or no attention was given to the costs imposed on others,
such as new entrants or workers. Given the lack of any pricing
for environmental externalities, neither was serious attention
given to the environmental impact of the utility’s investment
decisions. If an investor suffered a financial loss, a stranded cost
was considered equally meritorious for compensation, whether it
supported the operation of a polluting coal plant or a nuclear
plant or pipeline, each of which imposes very different impacts on
surrounding communities.84 A decision to compensate stranded
costs meant that a resource would continue to operate into the
future, but by prolonging the life of obsolete infrastructure
without considering broader social costs and benefits, it also left
many noneconomic values stranded. In other words, looking at
the financial impacts of each energy resource on investors and the
firm in isolation for purposes of stranded cost compensation has
blinded regulators from considering how cost recovery for
particular sources of energy supply has broader system-wide
effects on the grid or on the overall balance of energy resources in
the nation’s power supply portfolio.
II.

DECARBONIZATION’S IMPENDING STRANDED INVESTMENT
THREAT

Decarbonization of the grid will not come cheap.85 It
stands to be one of the most significant economic transformations

83 See Sanjeev Bhojraj et al., Voluntary Disclosure in a Multi-Audience
Setting: An Empirical Investigation, 79 ACCT. REV. 921, 939 (2004).
84 In part, this was because energy law was considered to be a separate paradigm,
entirely separate and distinct from environmental law. See Todd S. Aagaard, EnergyEnvironment Policy Alignments, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1517 (2015) (discussing modern synergies
between energy and environmental law).
85 The costs of a failure to achieve decarbonization, however, may be far
greater. See Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Nos. 14-2147, 14-2159, 14-2334, 2016
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the economy has experienced in the last century.86 To the extent
that the stranded costs associated with the transition to
decarbonization have never been addressed, this threatens to
slow any change, contributing to carbon lock-in in the energy
sector87 and discouraging new investment dollars from flowing
to new decarbonized energy infrastructure. As these transitions
occur, it can be predicted that the industry (and its investors)
will continue to show a reluctance to retire any assets that have
remaining useful life, regardless of their environmental
attributes or whether those investments are stranded because of
regulatory change, market forces, or technological innovation.
One can expect these firms to aggressively seek ex post
compensation. One also can expect incumbent firms to couch the
potential for financial losses with the transition in stranded
investment terms, inviting the regulatory process to leave
important other values stranded.
Changes to infrastructure are already beginning to
happen, leading to these kinds of claims for stranded cost
compensation. This observation is perhaps most salient for
existing coal plants, many of which are expected to be phased
out of operation with the regulation of carbon emissions, as
well as existing nuclear plants.88 No doubt, some existing
infrastructure will no longer be considered valuable as new
environmental regulations come into effect and energy markets
begin to price carbon emissions into investment decisions.
Many existing assets will need to be retired to make room for
more efficient and less polluting sources of energy, leading to a
major shift in investment in the industry. Equally important is
that new investment must simultaneously be pursued to allow
decarbonization to succeed—which might include a massive
investment in new-generation nuclear plants, combined-cycle
WL 4177217, at *16 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2016) (refusing to hold arbitrary and capricious a
Department of Energy cost-benefit analysis that included the social cost of carbon).
86 All of the deep decarbonization scenarios “see a decline in traditional fossil
fuel plant investment” of $10 billion. PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supra note
1, at 48. Taking the “mixed” scenario as a starting point, “increases in annual electricity
generation investments would increase $15 billion per year from 2021–2030” and over
$30 billion per year from 2031–2040. Id. at 47. “By 2050, the electricity sector would need
more than $50 billion per year of incremental investment” in electricity generation. Id. A
“high renewables” case would require more than $70 billion per year of new generation
investments by 2050. Id.
87 For a description of carbon lock-in, see Unruh, supra note 7, at 817.
88 See Claire Cameron, Coal Is Going, Going . . . Gone?, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 24,
2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/coal-is-going-going-gone/253641/ [https://perma.cc/
2KF6-ZKAB] (discussing the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) predictions
of the retirement of a significant number of coal-based power plants, along with a growth
in natural gas power generation); Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 173–92
(discussing challenges for nuclear power plants).
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natural gas plants, large-scale new solar and wind projects,
and the transportation infrastructure such as pipelines and
transmission lines that will interconnect these resources. The
transition to decarbonization shows how stranded cost issues
are not unique to old resources, but will be increasingly
important for new investments. Here, the article highlights the
stranded investment issues decarbonization presents for some of
these resources, which are already giving rise to new pleas for
stranded cost compensation by incumbent firms in the industry.
This section focuses on fossil fuel power plants, nuclear power
plants, and energy transportation infrastructure.
A.

Fossil Fuel Power Plants

Coal and natural gas power plants account for more
than 60% of the grid’s energy supply portfolio.89 Many of these
plants have already been in operation for decades. Given the
high fixed costs that have been paid to build and keep these
plants in operation, firms face strong incentives to keep them
in operation as long as they produce positive revenue streams
from energy sales. The marginal costs to the firm of using these
plants to produce energy can be very low, depending on the
price of the fuel they use to produce the next unit of energy.90
The impact of the carbon transition on these “legacy” fossil fuel
plants presents one of the most significant stranded cost
barriers to the decarbonization transition.
Coal-fired power is the obvious loser in the transition to
a low-carbon future.91 The Clean Power Plan (CPP), for example,
expressly contemplated a phase-out of existing coal—to be
replaced in the short term by increased utilization of natural gas
combined cycle (NGCC), and ultimately by increased new
renewables penetration.92 Even without the CPP, this transition
89 See Frequently Asked Questions: What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy
Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3
[https://perma.cc/J28S-CNCH].
90 For an overview, see Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 156–63 (providing
comparative cost profiles of various electricity fuels).
91 See Hammond & Pierce, supra note 17, at 2. Of course, if carbon capture and
sequestration (CCS) becomes a viable technology, there may be a role for coal. EPA’s
carbon emission rule for new power plants requires at least some use of this technology.
Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,509,
64,512–13 (Oct. 23, 2015).
92 For an early look at the projected future electricity fuel mix under the CPP,
see Laura Martin & Jeffrey Jones, The Effects of the Clean Power Plan, CLEAN TECHNICA
(June 24, 2016), https://cleantechnica.com/2016/06/24/effects-clean-power-plan/ [https://
perma.cc/Z6MN-PJ5K] (providing an early look at the projected future electricity fuel mix
under the CPP). While this article was in production, Donald Trump, who has called
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is occurring: Existing Clean Air Act (CAA) mandates—
including the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule93 and the Utility
MACT Rule94—have put pressure on coal-fired power in recent
years, increasing both the capital and operating costs associated
with such plants.95 These are regulatory changes, but they
should not be a surprise. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
directed EPA to address both cross-state air quality issues for
criteria pollutants and toxic emissions from the power sector.96
And although greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation under the CAA
may have come as a surprise to some,97 the power sector’s role in
climate change has long been recognized.98 At the very least,
serious conversations about mitigation in the United States are
nearing a decade old.
climate change a Chinese hoax, became President. Louis Jacobsen, Yes, Trump Did Call
Climate Change a Chinese Hoax, POLITIFACT (June 3, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/
truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jun/03/hillary-clinton/yes-donald-trump-did-call-climatechange-chinese-h/ [https://perma.cc/J5KX-KZCN]. Scott Pruitt, the Trump appointee
leading EPA, is a vocal climate denier, and overall, the CPP appears doomed. Coral
Davenport, E.P.A. Head Stacks Agency with Climate Change Skeptics, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/us/politics/scott-pruitt-environmentalprotection-agency.html [https://perma.cc/VM5N-GWUU]; Keith Goldberg, Trump Win
Could Moot Cases over Obama Climate Regs, LAW360 (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.law360.
com/articles/861201/trump-win-could-moot-cases-over-obama-climate-regs [https://perma.
cc/8ZED-UZQK]. Regardless of the CPP’s viability, the authors expect that the industrywide trends will be to continue to support efforts to invest in a low-carbon energy future.
93 Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter
and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011); see EPA v.
EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593 (2014) (upholding CSAPR).
94 The MACT Rule was held unlawful in Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699
(2015). The Rule, however, remained in effect and EPA has now issued a supplemental
finding meant to address the deficiencies. Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate
and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420 (Apr. 25, 2016). Some coal
companies actually argued against a stay because they had already convinced their state
PUCs to permit them to recover the costs for new pollution control equipment. Oral
Argument at 36:12–36:58, White Stallion Energy Ctr. v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 4, 2015) (No. 12-1100).
95 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at 24–26 (2015) (noting analyses include these regulations and
depicting the reference case for coal remaining flat); id. at 27 (attributing most coal
retirements to these two rules); NEIL COPELAND & DEBASHIS BOSE, BLACK & VEATCH,
IMPACT OF COAL PLANT RETIREMENTS ON THE CAPACITY AND ENERGY MARKET IN PJM 1
(2012), http://bv.com/docs/reports-studies/impact-of-coal-plant-requirements-on-the-capacityenergy-market-in-pjm.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WDQ-WTDH] (describing 28 GW of coalpowered capacity slated to retire by 2020, partly due to CSAPR and MACT rules).
96 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2704–05 (describing 1990 amendments
for hazardous air pollutants); Clear Air Act Overview: 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment
of Summary, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/1990-clean-air-actamendment-summary [https://perma.cc/VP2M-RANX].
97 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 583, 556–58 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with majority’s conclusion that the term “air pollutant” in the Clean Air
Act encompasses greenhouse gases).
98 See Stephen Ferrey, International Power on “Power”, 45 ENVTL. L. 1063,
1063 (2015) (describing history of efforts to use renewable electricity rather than fossilfueled electricity for climate change mitigation purposes).
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Market forces have also put pressure on coal. Natural
gas has stepped in as a baseload competitor; its low prices have
made it attractive to investors funding new power plants, and
have also contributed to low short-run marginal costs, making
it a hard competitor to beat on the competitive wholesale
markets.99 In fact, in its rule for new sources of carbon dioxide
emissions in the electricity sector, EPA justified its strict
approach for coal-fired power partly by explaining that very
little new coal will be built anyway given these market forces.100
The result is that coal-fired power plants are closing, coal
companies are going bankrupt,101 and coal’s share of power
generation is expected to decrease from well over half of the
power supply portfolio in the 1990s and early 2000s to about 18%
by 2040.102 Despite these negative results for coal companies and
coal industry workers, there are significant carbon and other airquality benefits to be gained by weaning ourselves from coal.103
But it is also true that there are social costs associated with
closing these plants. In parts of the country where natural gas
pipeline capacity is lacking—for example, the northeast during
winter’s high demand—coal provides the security of reliability
because the fuel itself is easily stored.104 Furthermore, the
economies of coal-producing states like West Virginia are heavily
dependent on the resource. As just one metric, the coal industry
has lost tens of thousands of jobs in recent years.105
99 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 158–63 (describing comparative
cost data and considerations for various electricity fuels); see also U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY: WITH DATA FROM MARCH 2016 tbl.1.1 (2016), http://
www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/current_year/march2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9BQ-FB
2H] (presenting power generation figures showing increasing contributions of natural gas
to power generation, culminating with its generating approximately the same amount of
power as coal in 2015).
100 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified,
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg.
64,509, 64,513–14 (Oct. 23, 2015).
101 Charles Riley & Chris Isidore, The Largest U.S. Coal Company Just Filed
for Bankruptcy, CNN MONEY (Apr. 13, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/13/news/co
mpanies/peabody-coal-bankruptcy/ [https://perma.cc/PQ2C-UQNS] (describing bankruptcy
filings of Peabody Energy and Arch Coal).
102 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016 EARLY
RELEASE: ANNOTATED SUMMARY OF TWO CASES 22 (2016), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/
aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2016).pdf [https://perma.cc/8K5L-6YQN].
103 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 172–73 (describing these issues
and collecting sources).
104 Id. at 165.
105 Drew Haerer & Lincoln Pratson, Employment Trends in the U.S. Electricity
Sector, 2008–2012, 82 ENERGY POL’Y 85 (2015) (estimating loss of over 49,000 coal jobs
during study period); see Kris Maher & Dan Frosch, Coal Downturn Hammers Budgets in
West Virginia and Wyoming, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/coal
-downturn-hammers-budgets-in-west-virginia-and-wyoming-1450822015 [https://perma.
cc/HMP7-BGZK].
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As coal’s share of the electricity supply wanes, natural
gas’s share is growing. In many states today, almost all of the new
power plant capacity coming online is natural gas. The use of
natural gas to produce electricity is expected to continue to
increase in the near future, given its abundant supply, low costs
relative to other fuel sources, and lower carbon impacts compared
to other fossil fuels.106 In contrast to older baseload coal plants,
natural gas plants are usually built as peaking resources (i.e.,
those that are primarily deployed to meet peak customer loads)
and offer many efficiencies as load following resources that can
complement the integration of variable resources such as wind
and solar into the grid.107
Yet one lurking concern is overinvestment in natural gas
power plants for purposes of power supply, which could readily
lead to overreliance on the fuel as a generation resource. For
example, the Union of Concerned Scientists has warned that
many states’ heavy short-term reliance on natural gas plants
presents a long-term risk of locking in investments in power
plants that could peak in use by 2030, potentially creating
massive new excess capacity problems.108 Concerns with the
grid’s future overreliance on natural gas are heightened by the
need for increased decarbonization over the coming decades, as
natural gas is not carbon-free; as some scholars have argued,
meeting our climate policy goals will require “eliminating
virtually all [of our] natural gas use by 2050.”109 The prospect of
future stranded costs for natural gas, akin to what is currently
being claimed by the coal industry, seems highly likely a decade
or two into the decarbonization transition.110

106 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects significant
additions of natural gas capacity, whether or not the CPP remains in place. U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 102, at 22.
107 See Natural Gas-Fired Combustion Turbines Are Generally Used to Meet
Peak Electricity Load, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13191 [https://perma.cc/2N9S-D262]; J. Nicolas Puga, The
Importance of Combined Cycle Generating Plants in Integrating Large Levels of Wind
Power Generation, 23 ELEC. J. 33, 37 (2010) (arguing natural gas can complement other
variable resources).
108 See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, RATING THE STATES ON THEIR RISK OF
NATURAL GAS OVERRELIANCE 1 (2015), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/
2015/12/natural-gas-overreliance-analysis-document.pdf [https://perma.cc/RE5Q-WST8].
109 WEISSMAN, supra note 3, at 8.
110 See also Hammond & Pierce, supra note 17, at 14–15 (describing features of
the CPP that would have made natural gas plants an increasingly high-risk investment).
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Nuclear Power Plants

Nuclear power represents approximately 20% of the
nation’s power supply portfolio.111 However, many existing
plants are facing early retirement, largely as a result of the
competitive electricity markets’ failure to value carbon.112 But
decarbonization scenarios anticipate that nuclear power, which
has no carbon emissions, will need to increase, and new plants
will need to be built.113 This makes nuclear plants a significant
potential stranded cost issue for the decarbonization transition
as well.
Like coal, nuclear power provides steady, reliable
baseload electricity with a fueling schedule that insulates it
from the pipeline capacity issues that can plague natural gas.114
Unlike coal and natural gas, nuclear power does not emit
criteria pollutants, toxics, or greenhouse gases.115 Thus, it has
not been subject to the same CAA regulatory pressures as coal
in recent years—though it has always been a highly regulated
industry.116 Nevertheless, nuclear power is struggling on the
competitive wholesale markets; several plants have begun the
decommissioning process, and others are currently listed as
marginal.117 The reasons relate to the dynamics of imperfectly
competitive markets. Because nuclear power must always run,
it is a price-taker, meaning it will take whatever clearing price
the wholesale markets provide regardless of its actual shortrun marginal or long-run average costs.118 Low natural gas
prices and increasing renewables penetration have contributed
to lower market clearing prices.119 And without a price on
carbon, the market is imperfect, making it harder for nuclear

111 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 102, at 22 (projecting significant
added natural gas capacity).
112 See generally Hammond & Spence, supra note 19 (providing detailed
diagnosis).
113 See, e.g., PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supra note 1, at 15 (noting
that without substantial carbon capture and sequestration, reliance on nuclear power
must remain an option).
114 Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 165.
115 Natural gas emits fewer of these pollutants than coal. Id. at 166–67. For a
full discussion of the comparative environmental externalities of the various electricity
fuel sources, see id. at 166–68.
116 See id. at 173–90 (arguing this level of regulation has caused nuclear power to
internalize costs that are externalities for competitor fuel sources, putting it at a
comparative economic disadvantage).
117 See generally id. (providing overview and diagnosis of nuclear power’s
struggles in wholesale markets).
118 Id. at 189–90.
119 Id.

670

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

power to compete given its significant continued operational
and safety costs.120
Nuclear power plants operating outside of the
competitive wholesale markets have not encountered these
challenges. In fact, the most prominent new reactors under
construction are in Georgia and South Carolina,121 where the
regulatory contract continues to provide cost recovery through
rate-making and can further be used to hedge future
uncertainties.122 Thus, whether a nuclear reactor is at risk of
becoming a stranded asset may well depend on the restructuring
status of its jurisdiction.123
From the perspective of a post-carbon grid, the position
of nuclear reactors raises important stranded cost issues—
albeit issues that present different stakes than existing coal
plants. Consider that existing reactors contribute over 60% of the
nation’s carbon-free electricity,124 and when reactors are shut
down, carbon emissions increase.125 Achieving carbon emission
reduction goals will require continued reliance on existing nuclear
plants, as well as substantial new investment in them.126 The
CPP127 did not afford credit to states that retained existing
120 See, e.g., JOHN M. DEUTCH ET AL., MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, UPDATE OF THE
MIT 2003 FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER 5–6 (2009), http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/
pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CMM-4VAK] (illustrating cost
competitiveness of nuclear power were carbon fully valued).
121 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 188 (describing regulatory
circumstances leading to new construction). As of this writing, the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) was conducting power ascension testing on the new Watts Bar Unit 2
reactor, which was licensed under an older procedural framework but was only recently
completed. See Watts Bar Unit 2 Complete and Commercial, TENN. VALLEY AUTH. (Oct. 19,
2016), https://www.tva.gov/Newsroom/Watts-Bar-2-Project [https://perma.cc/64KK-NZ4R]
(providing updates). It began commercial operation October 2016. Press Release, Nuclear
Energy Inst., TVA’s Watts Bar Unit 2 Begins Commercial Operation (Oct. 19, 2016).
122 See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing these states’ approaches to cost recovery
for the carrying costs of construction).
123 As is described infra Part III, the jurisdiction’s restructuring status may also
bear on a state’s options for addressing stranded cost issues.
124 T HE H ORINKO G RP ., N UCLEAR P OWER AND THE C LEAN E NERGY F UTURE
6 (2016).
125 Id. at 7. Regarding the closure of the Vermont Yankee power plant in
Vermont, see William Opalka, C02 Emissions Increase in ISO-NE: Loss of Nuclear Plant
Reverses Trend, RTO INSIDER (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.rtoinsider.com/co2-newengland-22278/ [https://perma.cc/QP7Y-MV4X]. For sources regarding the closure of the
San Onofre power plant in California, see CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD., 2014
EDITION CALIFORNIA GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION INVENTORY: 2000–2012, at 4 (2014),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/ghg_inventory_00-12_report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3CVW-RJYQ]. For experience in Japan following the moratorium on nuclear
power following Fukushima, see MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE & INDUS., LONG-TERM
ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND OUTLOOK 4 (2015), http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/
2015/pdf/0716_01a.pdf [https://perma.cc/244G-VGLL].
126 See PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supra note 1, at 15.
127 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40

2017]

STRANDED COSTS AND GRID DECARBONIZATION

671

nuclear power, but it did give credit for plant uprates and new
reactors.128 Further, the CPP contemplated credit trading as the
easiest path to compliance.129 Marginal plants thus face a
temporal gap: with the CPP stalled, and while there is no real
price on carbon, these plants could be considered stranded assets.
But in the next decade, it is likely that their value from a carbon
perspective will increase—whether from the CPP or some other
climate change mitigation policies. New York, for example, has
taken the policy view that nuclear power should help bridge
today’s carbon-heavy electric sector to the low-carbon grid of the
future.130 The stranded cost question is whether—and if so, how—
to support these plants while awaiting regulatory and market
dynamics that value their carbon contribution.
C.

Energy Transportation

Energy transportation is also not exempt from stranded
cost issues with impending decarbonization. As noted above,
construction of natural gas-fired power plants is projected to
increase over the next decade or so. Yet natural gas-fired
electricity requires not just power plants, but a transportation
infrastructure. This necessity presents even trickier future
excess capacity problems that relate to gas production as well as
power plants.
Currently, there are a number of mismatches between
the electricity and natural gas markets. Among these issues is
pipeline capacity: natural gas is sold on spot markets, and the
prices in recent times are significantly below their historical
averages.131 Electric power suppliers buy natural gas on those
spot markets, obtaining even lower prices by taking interruptible
service.132 Without long-term contracts, investors are reluctant to
take on the significant financial commitment needed to construct
C.F.R. pt. 60). The Supreme Court stayed the CPP during the pendency of litigation, the
outcome of which is uncertain given the Trump administration’s desire to rescind it. See
North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15A793 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016) (issuing stay); Robinson Meyer,
Trump’s Climate Agenda: Do Less, With Less, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.the
atlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/trumps-war-on-the-climate-begins/519159/
[https://
perma.cc/DZW7-R7ZZ] (describing expected executive order to dismantle CPP).
128 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,735.
129 See id. at 64,823; Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Electric Utility Generation Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014, 80 Fed.
Reg. 64,966, 64,968 (Oct. 23, 2015).
130 See sources cited supra note 16.
131 See Jake Huneycutt, Taking a Look at Historical Natural Gas Prices,
SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 19, 2015), http://seekingalpha.com/article/2830226-taking-a-look-athistorical-natural-gas-prices [https://perma.cc/XQ5R-GHL6].
132 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 165 & n.115 (collecting sources).
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new natural gas pipelines.133 Paradoxically, natural gas is flared
in some regions due to lack of pipeline infrastructure134 even while
there are shortages in other regions in the winter months when
natural gas is in demand for both heating and electricity
generation.135 This lack of pipeline infrastructure has already
created some stranded costs. In some areas of the country, for
example, natural gas wells have been drilled but not completed
due to the lack of transportation to get natural gas to market.136
Carbon emission reduction goals contemplate that NGCC
utilization in the nation’s power supply portfolio—currently
somewhere around 40%—could increase to as high as 75% to
replace
coal-fired
generation.137
Regional
transmission
organization such as PJM and MISO both contemplate that
achieving this increased utilization would require major new
pipeline infrastructure,138 and the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation has warned that significant pipeline
investment is needed to avoid reliability issues.139 This presents
another stranded cost issue: will investors want to build this
new infrastructure, knowing that the ultimate goal of the
electricity sector is to wean ourselves from natural gas as well as
coal? Keep in mind as well that once that infrastructure is in
place, there will be a new path dependency: stranded cost
concerns could mean reliance on natural-gas fired power longer
than would be optimal from a climate change mitigation
perspective.140 New electricity transmission infrastructure

133 For a full exploration of the contributing factors to a lack of pipeline capacity,
see generally Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S.
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947 (2015).
134 The most notorious example involves flaring in North Dakota’s Bakken field.
Id. at 1009–15.
135 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, WINTER 2013–2014 OPERATIONS AND
MARKET PERFORMANCE IN RTOS AND ISOS 8 (2014), http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staffreports/2014/04-01-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LAJ-YYRK] (describing significant electricity
generation outages during polar vortex due to gas curtailment, lack of fuel diversity, and
frozen coal).
136 See, e.g., Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 133, at 1005.
137 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,802–03. (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
138 To nudge investors toward firm natural gas contracts, PJM has adopted new
capacity market rules with significant penalties for generators that cannot dispatch when
called. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 152 FERC ¶ 61,064 (July 22, 2015); PJM
Interconnection, LLC, 151 FERC ¶ 61,208 (June 9, 2015).
139 N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., POTENTIAL RELIABILITY IMPACTS OF
EPA’S PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN 24–25 (2014), http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/
Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/Potential_Reliability_Impacts_of_EPA_Proposed_C
PP_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU39-474W].
140 Of course, some argue that this is already true. This article focuses on the use
of natural gas as a bridge fuel for electric power generation, as the CPP contemplated. See
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presents similar stranded cost challenges. On one hand,
regulatory certainty is necessary to attract capital investments
to build transmission lines in new locations for the
decarbonized grid. On the other hand, it is important that new
transmission lines do not help to prolong the asset life of older
fossil fuel generation power plants that would otherwise be
retired, thus exasperating the carbon legacy plant problem
highlighted above.141
III.

STRANDED COST COMPENSATION FOR GRID
DECARBONIZATION

These examples point to the almost intractable problem
presented by irreversible energy infrastructure investment
decisions and the path dependencies they create—an especially
salient challenge given the transition to a significantly
decarbonized energy grid. History shows how energy law is
consistently inept at retiring energy infrastructure with any
remaining life, though there are occasional counter-examples
related to the decommissioning of specific hydroelectric and
nuclear facilities.142 With new stranded cost issues already
occurring or predictable in the near future, this article now turns
its attention to how such costs might best be handled as we
transition to a decarbonized energy grid.
This part first discusses whether, given structural changes
the energy industry has undergone in recent decades, regulators
today might be more justified than ever in ignoring stranded cost
issues, including those associated with decarbonization’s
transition. Although these structural changes provide great
promise for future private management of many investor risks,
stranded cost compensation during the transition to deep
decarbonization may yet prove necessary. Still, regulators
should not follow the model of past stranded cost experiments.
Instead, in making decisions today about our future energy
infrastructure, regulators have an opportunity to write a new
stranded cost chapter for energy law, one that both facilitates
Hammond & Pierce, supra note 17, at 14–15 (hypothesizing that expected future shifts
away from natural gas may drive up prices in the near-term because of investor reluctance).
141 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line
Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2009) (arguing that without careful attention to
pricing and cost allocation, the expansion of transmission lines can benefit legacy power
plants rather than new power generators).
142 With both of these examples, federal regulators played a significant regulatory
role in decommissioning—a role that is not available for existing fossil fuel generation
plants. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 20.1401 (2016) (NRC regulations governing nuclear power plant
decommissioning); FPL Energy Maine Hydro, LLC, 107 FERC ¶ 61,120 (May 6, 2004)
(ordering surrender of hydro license and partial dam removal, with licensee’s agreement).
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the transition to decarbonization and provides a better balance
between certainty and flexibility than in the past. Front-end
stranded cost recovery for incremental energy infrastructure
investment decisions can attract new capital for decarbonization
by reducing uncertainty, while also ensuring that values
associated with energy reliability and carbon impacts are not
left stranded during the impending transition. In order to avoid
distorting returns on investment to favor carbon lock-in,
regulators must address stranded costs associated with
existing energy infrastructure under the same principles that
they apply to incentives designed to reduce uncertainty in the
investment in new resources.
A.

The Promise of Private Management of Stranded Costs

William Baumol and J. Gregory Sidak once predicted
that the “new mode of mixed competition and regulation” is one
“in which no such problem [of stranded costs] need arise
again.”143 Compared to fifty years ago, private investors today
are much better equipped to address the risks of many energy
transitions. The regulatory contract that once described the
industry can no longer be understood as a deal between a few
firms and the state.144 Shifts toward competitive energy
markets have created a regulatory environment that is much
more multifaceted in nature, with a range of firms, interest
groups, and stakeholders now serving as the main participants
in any regulatory bargain.145 Energy regulation today is not
understood as a binding bilateral deal subject to renegotiation
each time a major new infrastructure decision is made; it is
much more fluid and ongoing in nature.146
If FERC’s competitive restructuring of wholesale gas
and electric power markets had been effective in making the
energy sector perfectly competitive, then no firm or investor in
the energy industry today would face fundamentally different
risks than any other business. Order 888 made clear FERC’s
preference for a market competition policy based on open
access, but one should be careful not to overstate either the
scope or success of competitive energy markets.147 FERC’s
Baumol & Sidak, supra note 10, at 839.
Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 192.
145 Id. at 192–93.
146 See JIM ROSSI, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW (2005).
147 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451 (2005) (contrasting promise and
realities of restructuring the electricity markets).
143

144
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competitive restructuring efforts addressed only the wholesale
side of domestic energy markets, and even today, that
restructuring process is incomplete.148 State regulators retain
significant control over infrastructure related to retail gas and
electric power sales, with most states continuing to apply
traditional cost-based regulation to infrastructure decisions
regarding these transactions.149
Even though the rules of the game for energy markets
continue to evolve, it is undeniable that some structural changes
have created the potential for better private management of
business risks by firms and their investors. Under the
traditional regulatory contract, firms and their investors were
much more homogenous, with most regulation aimed at the
traditional, vertically integrated utility. Today, the energy
industry is comprised of a much more diverse range of investors
operating outside of the regulatory compact.150 Most new power
generation today, for example, is nonutility generation—plants
built by firms with whom no traditional regulatory compact can
be said to exist.151
In addition, with a greater range of firms operating in
the industry, private investors are better equipped to diversify
risks themselves. For example, with the decline of the
traditional utility’s dominance in the electric power industry,
firms operating in national markets today are better equipped
to diversify their investments across jurisdictions and regions of
the country.152 Also, in part due to technological innovations, the
scale of new energy supply investments is far smaller than the
kinds of large-scale baseload plants that were characteristic of
new investments in the 1960s and 1970s.153 This has allowed for
multiple, smaller-scale investments by larger firms that are
Id. at 460–61.
Id.
150 Cf. Richard F. Hirsch & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Technological Systems and
Momentum Change: American Electric Utilities, Restructuring, and Distributed
Generation Technologies, 36 J. TECH. STUD. 72, 78 (2006) (describing a new diversity of
stakeholders negotiating toward a new electric power industry consensus).
151 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 99, at ch. 6 (showing planned
near-term capacity additions).
152 For terrific general overviews of these structural changes, see STEVE ISSER,
ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES: MARKETS AND POLICY FROM THE 1978
ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT (2015); RICHARD F. HIRSCH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF
DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999).
153 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 99, at tbl.6.5 (showing numerous
planned generating unit capacity additions of less than ten megawatts summer capacity);
Jeff Riles, Jr., Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Enel Green Power N. Am., Inc., Remarks at GW Law
J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Environmental Law Symposium: The Electricity Mix of the
Future: Environment, Economics, and Governance (Mar. 11, 2016) (describing renewable
company Enel’s approach).
148
149
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better able to diversify the assets on their balance sheets than
utilities in the past.154 For instance, many firms with power
plants that they consider to be uneconomic seek to securitize or
sell these assets by selling them (or spinning them off),155
instead of asking regulators for stranded cost recovery.
Moreover, in recent decades financial regulation has
improved the quality of information about investments that is
available to investors in energy firms. Corporate disclosure
expectations today are much more cognizant of potential
changes in business and technological conditions as well as
regulatory regimes.156 One example is the past popularity of
many utility stocks as low-risk investment vehicles in worker
pensions. Historically, pension managers may not have been
required to disclose the full risks of these investments, but
institutional disclosure requirements for investment managers
have changed significantly.157 Past utility accounting practices,
which were premised on rate recovery of asset costs, may have
understated risks associated with long-term capital investments
against the backdrop of changing conditions—a risk that firms
today must disclose. Increasingly too, regulators are moving
toward the disclosure of future risks associated with climate
change, and this should better enable investors to price these
risks in making future investment decisions.158 There is some
evidence to suggest that disclosure may encourage firms to do
little more than reassure investors,159 but at the very minimum,
investors today in the energy sectors are better informed about
risks than investors half a century ago.
These changes in the nature of regulation, industry
structure, and risk disclosure may not make concerns about
154 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, POWER GENERATION INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY
MARKETS 14 (2003), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Fraser.gen.invest.elec.
mkts.1203.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJ97-H2X8].
155 These were commonly used strategies for addressing the stranded costs
associated with electric power industry restructuring. See ISSER, supra note 152, at 200–03.
156 See, e.g., David S. Ruder et al., The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Preand Post-Enron Responses to Corporate Financial Fraud: An Analysis and Evaluation, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1103 (2005).
157 Id. at 1112–55 (detailing numerous changes to disclosure requirements).
158 See Rick E. Hansen, Climate Change Disclosure by SEC Registrants: Revisiting
the SEC’s 2010 Interpretive Release, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 487, 487 (2012)
(discussing SEC rules requiring disclosure of climate change risks); see also Sey-Hyo Lee &
Marushka Bland, Carbon Transparency: Public Companies Face Rising Pressure to Disclose
Climate Change Risks, FORTNIGHTLY (May 2008), https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/
2008/05/carbon-transparency?page=0%2C0 [https://perma.cc/H7AN-43NW].
159 See, e.g., James W. Coleman, How Cheap Is Corporate Talk? Comparing
Companies’ Comments on Regulations with Their Securities Disclosures, 40 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 49 (2016) (describing how oil companies told federal regulators that
a renewable fuel standard would harm them financially while simultaneously telling
investors that they are well positioned to comply with any new requirements).
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transition costs irrelevant. But one would expect private investors
to be much better equipped to deal with transitions, especially
where they involve business assumptions or technology decisions
over which investors can assume risks themselves, or over which
the firm has some degree of control. After all, the history of
energy regulation shows that transition is the only certainty, so
new investors should not be permitted to claim surprise for the
kinds of business risks that they can control.160
Consider again the fuel costs that drove the stranded cost
problem with pipelines’ take-or-pay contracts. Today, a pipeline
operating on a national scale would be well positioned to address
the risks of changes on its own and to hedge its take-or-pay
contracts with other instruments. Such developments point to
new investors being much better equipped than in the past to
address the stranded cost problem in making their risk decisions,
particularly to the extent that stranded cost issues reflect nothing
more than ordinary business risks. Of course, one can still expect
that the sheer size of many energy infrastructure investments—
along with long asset lives—will produce more significant
transition cost problems down the road than are faced by most
sectors of the economy. But that should not deter regulators from
encouraging private investors to act on their own to price the
risks of changes at the front end, where they can do so.
B.

Complementary Stranded Cost Recovery Mechanisms

Given the many private mechanisms for managing the risk
of stranded costs, one might argue that regulatory approaches for
stranded cost recovery going forward are either unnecessary or
poor public policy because they create disincentives to address the
issue in the marketplace. No doubt, the regulatory process can do
a better job of encouraging investors to price risks themselves,
especially the business risks of future economic or technology
changes. Encouraging investors to price these kinds of risks at the
time they make a decision to invest in assets could help to shift
such risk to investors. This would allow regulators to focus their
attention on pricing the residual risk of unexpected regulatory
change or other values that are not already priced as risks in the
competitive market.
The regulatory bargain in energy markets remains
much more of a moving target than in most other sectors of the
economy. Existing energy infrastructure may be more capital160

Section I.A.

See, for example, the discussion of the Charles River Bridge case, supra
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intensive and long-lived than assets in other sectors of the
economy, but even in those other sectors, regulators must be
attentive to the transition costs associated with regulatory
change.161 Changes in the energy industry in recent decades
thus do not render stranded costs concerns irrelevant, but
provide energy regulators an opportunity to give stranded cost
recovery a new focus, better aligning investor signals with core
public values. Stranded cost compensation with the
decarbonization transition presents some unique opportunities
for regulatory reform that can avoid stranded cost myopia,
especially to the extent that prices and investment signals in
competitive energy markets fail to value reliability and
environmental attributes of energy resources.
To begin, consider the massive levels of infrastructure
investment that will be required to meet the goals of
decarbonization. Keeping warming under two degrees Celsius
is estimated to require hundreds of billions of dollars of new
capital investment over the coming decades.162 Presumably,
many of these new energy infrastructure investments will be
pursued because of their carbon emissions advantage over
existing energy supply resources. Unless the carbon attributes
of energy supply are somehow priced in all market decisions
concerning these resources, however, the returns that firms
offer to investors may be too low to attract new investments,
leading to underinvestment in new resources and
overdependence on old ones. In addition, uncertainties and
high costs surrounding new resources such as next-generation
nuclear plants, offshore wind, and electric power transmission
have frightened investors away from sinking capital into such
projects. To make new technological investments attractive,
and to achieve the right balance of energy resources for
decarbonization, the returns offered to investors must provide
some premium for uncertainty while also pricing the carbon
attributes and other values that are important to the energy
system. As is discussed above, traditional stranded cost
compensation included little or no consideration of these forms
of stranded benefits in the calculation of stranded costs.
161 See Richard L. Revesz & Allison L. Westfahl Kong, Regulatory Change and
Optimal Transition Relief, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1581, 1582 & n.1 (2011) (discussing
transition problems with grandfathering pollution from old power plants); see also Louis
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 511 (1986);
Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J.
LEGAL STUD. 37, 56 (2008).
162 See PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supra note 1, at 47 (noting the
need for an increase in new investments in the range of $15–$70 billion annually between
today and 2050).
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Regulators paying attention to stranded cost recovery as a
mechanism for reducing uncertainty and addressing these
values ex ante (i.e., before each energy resource investment
decision is made) may better facilitate a transition to
decarbonization that is attentive to the balance of resources in
the energy system as a whole. By avoiding wasteful ex post
lobbying to address stranded costs decades from now, it also
could help to reduce the overall cost of capital for a decarbonized
energy system.
But approaching stranded costs only as a way of
incentivizing investors to steer capital to new decarbonized
energy resources could also be counterproductive. The transition
to decarbonization is plagued by an old resource problem too,
which if left unaddressed can readily reinforce carbon lock-in.163 It
is thus imperative to recognize the challenge of addressing both
new and old capital investment with the transition to
decarbonized energy infrastructure. Subjecting old energy
infrastructure to a different stranded cost recovery than the
principles used to incentivize investments in new infrastructure
risks distorts investor returns to favor carbon-lock by delaying
new investments.
With respect to existing investments, such as those
discussed in Part II, stranded cost recovery will remain
important to ensuring that the transition to decarbonization
occurs in a timely manner, and is not delayed further by path
dependency. While this article does not propose a bailout of all
existing assets, a failure to address stranded costs concerning
decarbonization of existing energy supply resources risks the
possibility that some transitions may never occur. Experience
has shown that some stranded cost recovery might be a
worthwhile price to pay for industry cooperation or even
stakeholder buy-in in the midst of a transition.164 It is equally
important that regulators addressing stranded costs for existing
resources be attentive to issues that they have ignored in the
past, such as the social costs of transitions. Specifically, as with
new energy infrastructure, the transition issues presented by
existing resources underscores the importance of recognizing
attributes of different energy resources that competitive energy
Unruh, supra note 7, at 817.
See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Can the FERC Overcome Special Interest Politics? With the
“Carrot/Stick” Incentives, the FERC Has Learned That Utilities Will Volunteer to Make the
Choice Regulators Want, 133 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 31, 33 (1995) (describing FERC’s carrot/stick
approach to minimizing special interest resistance to electricity restructuring); see also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, 10 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 53, 55 (1995) (describing how transition from regulatory contract to regulated
market creates stranded costs, incentivizing industry to stall).
163

164
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markets today do not value in their pricing mechanisms when
calculating stranded costs.
Before we proceed, we emphasize that our argument is
pragmatic: We are not contending that any one kind of stranded
cost recovery is the most economically efficient regulatory
approach,165 or that it is required as a matter of contract or the
Constitution.166 Instead, the regulatory approach we propose can
provide forms of stranded cost recovery that are politically
expedient, reasonably justifiable, and useful for easing the
transition to a clean energy future.
1. Temporal Approaches and Considerations
As the historical examples show, energy law has
traditionally dealt with stranded costs for investors and firms
once they arise, often long after initial private investment
decisions are made. This ex post form of stranded cost recovery
contributes to some problematic behaviors in the regulatory
process by encouraging firms and their investors to lobby
against change, as well as discouraging firms and regulators
from being attentive to stranded benefits and to the public
values that need to be protected in transitioning to a new
normal.167 It should not come as a surprise that the past forms of
stranded cost compensation produced by this kind of regulatory
process have appeared to be little more than a bribe to buy
industry acquiescence in energy sector changes or, worse yet, a
bailout that comes at the cost of consumers. If the history of
energy law teaches anything, however, it is that transitions and
change ought to be expected in the energy sector. It follows that
regulatory approaches that force both regulators and investors
to consider stranded cost issues in making current investment
decisions, rather than only leaving them for the future, are
worth consideration. Here the article canvasses just a few
examples to show that energy regulators are already considering
this as a way of encouraging new investments associated with
grid decarbonization.
One way to encourage such investments to build
expensive new infrastructure projects, especially where there is
165 This article focuses on whether and how stranded cost recovery should be
allowed by regulators, and what core values it should reflect. It does not address the actual
financial calculation of stranded costs. For various discussions of methods of calculating
actual stranded costs, see CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 65; SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note
62, at 394–96; Ajay Gupta, Tracking Stranded Costs, 21 ENERGY L.J. 113 (2000).
166 Cf. Rossi, supra note 64, at 299–306.
167 See supra Section I.B.1.
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uncertainty about the future, is to accelerate recovery for
construction costs to the front end—when construction is
occurring—rather than requiring infrastructure to be built and
operating before recovery is permitted.168 Several jurisdictions
permit this approach, which is being used most notably for the
only new nuclear reactors under construction.169 This approach
incentivizes investors to move forward with significant capital
undertakings even against the backdrop of uncertainty by
lessening any concern that if regulatory treatment of a project
changes midconstruction, they will not have to repeat history’s
nuclear cancelation episode.170 On the other hand, this approach
shifts some of the burdens of uncertainty to customers. Their
interests are protected only minimally: they have the
predictability of CWIP being spread over a set period, and (using
Georgia as an example) they have at least some oversight
through the regulatory process, which requires periodic reports
by the utility.171 But construction disputes, delays, and increased
costs can still pose issues.172
168 This is typically referred to as the “used and useful” requirement and is
found in a number of jurisdictions’ statutes. For example, Pennsylvania law requires
that rates for electricity be fixed without consideration of a utility’s expenditures for
nuclear power generation plants that were planned but never built because they were not
“used and useful in service to the public.” 66 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1315
(West 2016). Utilities incurring millions of dollars in preliminary construction expenses to
recover these costs from customers sued Pennsylvania regulators, alleging that this was
an unconstitutional taking of their property without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299,
301 (1989). Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Pennsylvania law, reasoning
that the “end result” was just and reasonable and the Takings Clause did not dictate a
specific method for cost recovery. Id. at 314. (“The economic judgments required in rate
proceedings are often hopelessly complex and do not admit of a single correct result. The
Constitution is not designed to arbitrate these economic niceties.”).
169 See Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 773 F.2d 327,
330–36 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing FERC’s methods of cost recovery during construction,
including allowance for funds used during construction (AFUDC) and construction work in
progress (CWIP)); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-25(c)(3) (2016) (note that Georgia’s statute applies
only to nuclear reactors approved within a limited time window, making Southern Company
the only eligible company); Georgia Power’s Application for the Certification of Units 3 and 4
at Plant Vogtle and Updated Integrated Resource Plan, No. 27,800, 2010 WL 2647607, at
*10–11 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 17, 2010) [hereinafter Georgia Power’s Application]
(finding Georgia Power’s inclusion of CWIP in rate base would benefit ratepayers). Compare
S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-33-220(2) (2011) (extending CWIP recovery to both nuclear and coal,
provided that coal plants must comply with Best Available Control Technology for air
emissions as defined by EPA); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-6.0423(6) (2007) (permitting a
utility to petition the Florida Public Service Commission to recover carrying costs).
170 See supra Section I.A.1.
171 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 46-3A-7(b) (2016) (requiring monitoring reports);
Georgia Power’s Application, 2010 WL 2647607, at *7 (additionally requiring monthly
status reports on CWIP).
172 E.g., Thomas Overton, Even More Delays and Cost Overruns for Vogtle
Expansion, POWER (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.powermag.com/even-more-delays-and-costoverruns-for-vogtle-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/PB3H-8RMH] (detailing new reports of
cost overruns, delays, and construction litigation).
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Cost recovery can also be apportioned to in-service
assets as they come online, enabling investors to earn a return
even for projects that are not yet fully complete. For example,
Mississippi Power’s Kemper County Energy Facility is an
integrated gasification combined cycle plant that will be
accompanied by carbon capture technology.173 It is designed to
use lignite coal and will be the first plant to employ these
technologies at this scale (its capacity is 582 MW).174 It is not
yet fully online, but the state’s public utilities commission
(PUC) has approved cost recovery for the parts of the plant that
are already in service and generating electricity.175 The Kemper
facility has also been plagued by construction delays and
increased costs,176 but these have been allocated somewhat
between investors and customers. There is a cap on the costs to
customers associated with the power plant portion of the
project,177 but uncapped costs are those associated with the
lignite mine, CO2 pipeline, and “improvements to design.”178
Mississippi Power’s parent company reports it has taken a $2.5
billion write-down.179
At the federal level, the Modified Accelerated Cost
Recovery System permits certain renewable energy projects to
recover their investments through depreciation deductions.180 To
qualify for the 50% first-year bonus depreciation, these projects
must be in service by January 1, 2018.181 Some states are also
allowing for an excise tax on energy sales to finance a trust fund
to jump start renewable investments.182 Others have considered
guaranteed cost recovery for utilities’ purchases of renewable

173 See Quick Facts, MISS. POWER, http://www.mississippipower.com/about-energy/
plants/kemper-county-energy-facility/facts [https://perma.cc/F3F6-55ZE].
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Indeed, the plant lost its tax credit because it opened too late. See Jack
Weatherly, Mississippi Power: Tax Credit Likely to Be Repaid, MISS. BUS. J. (Sept. 30, 2015),
http://msbusiness.com/2015/09/mississippi-power-tax-credit-likely-to-be-repaid/ [https://
perma.cc/D7M4-QNCF].
177 See Kemper County Energy Facility Costs Through May 2016 (in Billions),
MISS. POWER, http://www.mississippipower.com/pdf/kemper/Kemper-Cost-Breakdown.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E9LD-ZEG7].
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Modified Accelerated Cost-Recovery System (MACRS), ENERGY.GOV, http://
energy.gov/savings/modified-accelerated-cost-recovery-system-macrs [https://perma.cc/
HCD4-GLS7].
181 Id.
182 See, e.g., MASS. TECH. COLLABORATIVE (MTC), RENEWABLE ENERGY
RESULTS FOR MASSACHUSETTS: A REPORT ON THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TRUST FUND
1998–2008 (2008), http://masstech.org/sites/mtc/files/documents/2008%20Renewable%
20Energy%20Trust%20Report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/J39Q-TL5W].
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power as a strategy to avoid the uncertainty that plagued nuclear
plant cost recovery.183
These examples show just a few ways that regulators can
address uncertainty by providing investors some compensation
for risk early on—whether during construction or early in an
asset’s life—so that the project’s full lifetime need not pass
before investors fully receive compensation for the risks they
assume in their investments. For those capital-intensive projects
involving first-mover technologies, or projects facing high levels
of uncertainty, such arrangements can help alleviate investor
reluctance. They come at some cost initially, but by reducing
investor uncertainty, they have the promise of reducing the
overall regulatory cost of capital for projects in comparison to
only allowing for stranded cost recovery decades into the future.
Either customers or taxpayers will bear these stranded costs,
however, so it remains crucial for a regulatory process that
carefully assesses the need for the project and the overall
benefits and burdens to ensure that the investments are
worthwhile. By placing all of these decisions at the front end of a
regulatory examination of the value of energy infrastructure,
such a temporal shift would better allow regulators to look at
how the cost of capital for each energy resource fits into a more
general assessment of the cost of capital for the firm and the
benefits of new investments for the energy system.
One concern with these methods of temporal risk shifting
is that, to the extent that they focus solely on the present value of
the investor or firm’s financial costs, they treat the noninvestor
attributes of all energy resources the same. For example, basing
early stranded cost recovery purely on compensating market risk
treats the environmental and reliability attributes of every energy
resource equally, even if these are not valued by investors because
of the lack of any current pricing mechanism that produces a
revenue stream. As an illustration, new natural gas plants are
often touted as providing a “bridge” to the low-carbon energy
system, while a new nuclear plant may provide a longer-term

183 A provision of Florida law requires full cost recovery by a public utility of
all reasonable and prudent contracts incurred for renewable energy projects, without
differentiation between customer classes. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.91(3) (West 2008).
Florida has also considered allowing renewable projects similar early cost recovery to
that available for nuclear plants, but these proposals have consistently been rejected.
See, e.g., Herman K. Trabish, Florida Legislators Bring Bills to Boost Solar, Limits
Utilities Billing Power, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/
florida-legislators-bring-bills-to-boost-solar-limit-utilities-billing-po/355275/ [https://perma.
cc/9EPH-H4WA].
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resource for decarbonization.184 Even if the financial risks
associated with each project were otherwise similar, providing
similar risk compensation to incentivize investments in both
resources would lead to overinvestment in gas plants and
contribute to carbon lock-in by delaying their retirement in the
future, when lower carbon alternatives can be deployed. In
other words, unless other public values are considered in
setting these incentives, early stranded cost compensation
based entirely on reducing financial risks to investors could
readily suffer from the same narrow-mindedness as past
stranded cost compensation, effectively leaving stranded public
values that are central to the transition to decarbonization.
Regulators in the past have failed to address stranded
benefits and broader values beyond investor protection, in part
because an ex post stranded cost compensation regulatory
process rewards firms that ignore or withhold disclosing them.
In the past, firms seeking ex post compensation did not have
incentives to claim future benefits that might offset these costs
until the stranded cost compensation was resolved.185 By
contrast, addressing stranded costs at the front end would force
all firms offering energy resources to be transparent about both
the costs and benefits associated with those resources. To
combat concerns about certain energy values or attributes not
being priced in energy markets—for example, absent a carbon
price, low-carbon energy resources may fail to attract investors
in the first place—legislatures or regulators could address
environmental attributes in approaching incentives designed to
attract investors to new projects. Alternatively, regulators
could condition early recovery and other approvals on a
promise to retire an asset at some point in the future.186 For
example, a legislature concerned about the need to ultimately
shift away from natural gas might set schedules tapering the
184 One study, for example, sees the production of electricity from natural gas
peaking in the year 2030, after which its deployment will begin to decline. See NELSON
ET AL., supra note 8, at 25. On the stranded cost problem associated with natural gas
infrastructure, see also Robert Walton, Why Natural Gas Investments Could Spell
Trouble for Electric Utilities: A Study Says There’s a Place for Natural Gas in the US
Power Mix, but How Big Is That Place?, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.utility
dive.com/news/why-natural-gas-investments-could-spell-trouble-for-electric-utilities/41
3368/ [https://perma.cc/AWS7-9WEU].
185 See Bhojraj et al., supra note 83, at 924 (citing accounting article on this
disclosure problem with ex post stranded cost recovery).
186 One recent article refers to these kinds of proactive limited approvals as
“sunrise” provisions. See Christopher Serkin & Michael Vandenbergh, Prospective
Grandfathering (forthcoming __ MINN. L. REV. __) (on file with authors) (arguing for a sort
of “sunrise” on the approval of new energy resources that have an adverse carbon-impact,
based on a front incentive coupled with an enforceable promise not to lobby for keeping the
resource in operation indefinitely).
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availability of cost recovery over time.187 Plants’ licenses could
also include definite expiration dates, creating a presumption
of closure rather than renewal.188
Shifting compensation for these kinds of risks to the
front-end of an asset may, of course, increase the firm’s cost of
capital for some new energy projects. Inevitably, this will come
at some cost to consumers, but no one claims that the transition
to decarbonization will be cheap. A higher return on investment
will be essential to attracting new investors to low-carbon
infrastructures such as next-generation nuclear power plants,
large-scale renewable plants, and expensive new transmission
lines to facilitate broader regional deployment of renewable
energy. In addition, although the cost of capital for some
investments may go up when initial investments are being
considered, it is not clear that the firm’s overall cost of capital (or
what is known as the regulatory cost of capital) will follow suit.
This is because regulators decades into the future will not face
the same pressures of wasteful lobbying by incumbent firms to
provide for back-end stranded cost recovery.189 And even if the
cost of capital for some firms were to increase, applying these
kinds of principles to all investment compensation decisions
would work to reduce the system-wide (trans-firm) cost of capital
related to decarbonized energy infrastructure.
Equally important, providing incentives to attract investors
to new decarbonized energy investments cannot, on its own,
overcome lock-in where existing carbon-intensive energy resources
remain in operation, and face lower marginal operational costs.
Raising the return on investment to address uncertainty for new
resources would attract new investment dollars, but this could
backfire if, once new infrastructure goes online, the marginal costs
of deploying low-carbon resources do not compare favorably to
carbon-intensive resources built decades ago.190

187 See also WEISSMAN, supra note 3, at 2 (proposing that legislatures set final
dates after which no new NG plants will be approved).
188 Of course, whether this would be a state or federal option would depend on
the type of plant.
189 To the extent there is full recovery in present value for the risks associated
with stranded costs at the front end, an enforceable regulatory mechanism to retire
permits or plants in the future would help limit investors from having a second bite at
apple and lobbying regulators for such recovery in the future. See Serkin &
Vandenbergh, supra note 186. Absent such a provision, any ex post assessment of
stranded cost would need to be considered nothing more than a true-up to past
compensation.
190 One of the authors has made this point, suggesting that once built, new
transmission lines might be utilized to favor existing resources like coal plants with
lower marginal costs. See Rossi, supra note 141, at 1042–44.
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To avoid carbon lock-in, it is thus just as imperative for
regulators to address stranded costs for existing energy resources,
such as the examples involving older nuclear and coal plants
highlighted in Part II, in a similar manner. For example,
regulators providing stranded cost compensation for existing
resources should not only be attentive to protecting a firm’s
investors to ensure that financial risks are sufficiently
compensated, but they must also be attentive to the reliability
and environmental attributes of energy resources. Attention to
the energy attributes of various resources would lead regulators
to approach stranded investments for some existing coal plants
differently from some existing nuclear plants, or to treat existing
gas pipelines differently across geographic areas based on the
need for capacity to support decarbonized energy infrastructure in
different regions. If incentives for new energy resources
compensate investors for risks in a manner that contemplates
values such as reliability and environmental attributes, so too
should compensation for risks associated with older resources. A
failure to treat risk compensation for new and existing resources
in a similar manner regarding these values in stranded cost
compensation could distort the cost of capital to favor existing
resources, resulting in the same kind of wasteful delay that
characterized the grandfathering of existing power plants under
the Clean Air Act.191
2. Reconciling (Some) Stranded Cost Recovery with
Competitive Markets
In most of the examples discussed above, cost recovery
through ratemaking is the norm (as it remains in most states),
and regulators can creatively permit investors to receive early
compensation for risks to avoid future stranded cost issues. But,
to raise an issue that has puzzled energy lawyers at least since
FERC’s Order 888, what regulatory approaches are available in
competitive interstate energy markets? Overcoming stranded
cost myopia with the transition toward decarbonized energy
infrastructure will require energy law to resolve some of these
issues, and here, this article offers a few thoughts on steps
toward that goal.
Consider again the current issue of marginal merchant
nuclear power plants, which are at risk of early closure
notwithstanding their reliability and climate benefits. As
suggested above, this particular stranded cost issue is driven by
191

See, e.g., Revesz & Kong, supra note 161, at 1632.
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an imperfect market,192 and there are good reasons to treat these
resources differently than fossil-fueled plants because of their
comparative reliability and environmental benefits. The question
that remains, however, is whether regulators can endorse
compensating investor risks for certain forms of power generation
against the backdrop of competitive interstate energy markets, or
whether federal competition policy preempts regulators from
taking such an approach.193
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hughes v. Talen
Energy Marketing194 likely places some constraints on stranded
cost recovery, at least for issues arising from flaws in the
wholesale markets. In Hughes, the Court invalidated a Maryland
scheme that provided incentives for constructing new natural gas
plants.195 Perceiving the wholesale capacity market to be
insufficient to incentivize new construction within its borders,
Maryland enacted a scheme whereby the power plant owners
would be compensated with a fixed revenue stream for capacity
that cleared the relevant market.196 In other words, the
compensation was designed to provide more revenue for the
plants than what they would receive on the capacity market.197
Maryland is one of thirteen states that have authorized their
utilities to operate in PJM—a regional transmission organization
that operates the largest organized wholesale power market in
the United States. Under the Federal Power Act (FPA), “FERC
has approved the PJM capacity auction as the sole ratesetting
mechanism for sales of capacity to PJM, and has deemed the
clearing price per se just and reasonable.”198 Because Maryland’s
auction for new in-state generation interfered with FERC’s
exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale sales of energy
under the FPA, the Court upheld a lower court determination
that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution preempts the
Maryland scheme.199
The Court left observers questioning how far beyond its
facts Hughes might extend.200 Although it expressly emphasized
For such a discussion, see Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 173–90.
For arguments suggesting that states’ policy options are constrained depending
on their restructuring status, see id. at 209; Hammond & Pierce, supra note 17, at 16–17.
194 Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg. LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
195 New Jersey attempted a similar approach, which the Third Circuit invalidated
in PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).
196 Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1293.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 1297.
199 Id. at 1299.
200 E.g., Emily Hammond, Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC: Energy Law’s
Jurisdictional Boundaries—Take Three, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (Oct. 2015), http://
192

193
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the narrowness of its holding,201 the Court suggested that states
may not tether revenues to wholesale market participation or
condition payments on capacity clearing the relevant auction.202
At the same time, the Court left open “the permissibility of
various other measures States might employ to encourage
development of new or clean generation, including tax incentives,
land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned
generation facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector.”203 The
concepts of “tethering,” “conditioning,” and “re-regulation” all
suggest limits on the spectrum of state options in moving toward
decarbonization, but the contours of those limits are unclear.
Hughes appears to constrain the ability of state regulators
to adopt investment incentives to compensate investors for their
risk (including stranded cost recovery) if these target federal
wholesale power market prices. After all, these kinds of incentives
or subsidies would seem to be fundamentally at odds with federal
policies favoring competitive power markets, especially to the
extent that they invite states to give incumbent firms favorable
treatment over out-of-state sources of energy or otherwise
distorting price signals in interstate markets. Indeed, FERC’s
initial response to the decision indicates some hostility toward
stranded cost recovery for legacy coal or nuclear plants that are
no longer competitive in regional wholesale power markets
operating under similar rules as in Maryland.204
In traditionally regulated states like Georgia and South
Carolina, however, forward-looking regulatory initiatives for new
clean energy construction do not seem problematic. These states
are not within competitive wholesale markets like PJM, nor have
they restructured at the retail level.205 Unlike Maryland,
therefore, these states have retained their full authority to decide
what values to compensate. Although wholesale costs must be
carried forward into state rate-making proceedings,206 states
retain authority to set the utility’s return on investment.
Moreover, the wholesale costs in these states are not derived from
www.gwlr.org/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc-energy-laws-jurisdictional-boundariestake-three/ [https://perma.cc/ZG5J-HFHG].
201 Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299 (“Our holding is limited: We reject Maryland’s
program only because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.”).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 See John Funk, FERC Rejects PUCO-Approved FirstEnergy, AEP Power
Deals, CLEVELAND (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2016/
04/ferc_rejects_puco_approval_of.html [https://perma.cc/6AYW-6AYR] (describing FERC’s
rejection of monthly surcharges aimed at protecting existing coal and nuclear plants from
competitive markets).
205 Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 209.
206 Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 961 (1986).
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competitive auctions, but rather from bilateral contracts.207
Providing compensation for the carrying costs of construction,
therefore, do not “second-guess” or “disregard[ ] [an] interstate
wholesale rate[ ] FERC has deemed just and reasonable.”208 Thus,
in contrast to the regional capacity market that FERC had
approved for PJM, in many other parts of the country retail
reliability (and the need for new power supply capacity)
remains within the wheelhouse of state regulators and is not
priced in the interstate wholesale market.209
Still, two-thirds of electricity use in the United States
takes place within the organized competitive markets. And
absent any effective market price on carbon (such as a national
carbon tax), regional initiatives (including PJM’s capacity
market) fail entirely to price the carbon attributes of various
sources of energy.210 As Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Hughes
majority, “We reject Maryland’s program only because it
disregards an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.”211
Although somewhat unclear, the majority seems to leave open
state flexibility to adopt power supply incentives and subsidies
that advance other values, beyond what is reflected in FERCapproved market prices.212 Regulatory measures that states are
utilizing to promote clean power generation, especially those
based on the carbon attributes of different energy resources,
may, therefore, be able to coexist with FERC’s regulation of
wholesale power markets.
Hughes, therefore, leaves states considerable space to
endorse important regulatory values in the transition to a
decarbonized grid where these values are not priced in the
wholesale competitive power market regulated by FERC. In
addressing stranded cost compensation for the risks associated
with energy infrastructure, state regulators should be encouraged
See Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 154.
Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298–99.
209 Even where, as in PJM, capacity markets provide some reliability pricing in
the wholesale market, it is not clear that they provide a perfect market valuation of
reliability values associated with different energy resources. The American Public Power
Association, for example, has highlighted how long-term contracts provide a superior way
of promoting reliability in comparison to capacity markets, and that capacity markets can
result in different reliability pricing based on how a state chooses to address its retail
market. See Randy Elliott, Staying Power of a Bad Idea: Capacity Markets’ Reliability
Pricing Mechanism, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N (Sept. 8, 2015), http://blog.publicpower.org/
sme/?p=761 [https://perma.cc/XM2L-E7LF].
210 Hammond & Spence, supra note 19, at 174, 212.
211 Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
212 Id. Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence also underscored “the importance of
protecting the States’ ability to contribute, within their regulatory domain, to the Federal
Power Act’s goal of ensuring a sustainable supply of efficient and price-effective energy.”
Id. at 1300 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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208
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to approach new infrastructure with the aim of advancing values
such as low-carbon energy. Of course, as Hughes reminds us, such
efforts cannot be motivated by or target a FERC-approved
exclusive scheme for pricing wholesale power sales, such as the
capacity market operated by PJM. However, to the extent that
stranded cost recovery is aimed at social values that are not
currently valued in competitive market prices as approved by
FERC, such as retail reliability or carbon impacts of various
energy resources, it is not inconsistent with Hughes’s
preemption analysis for states to compensate these energy
resources differently, even through subsidies.
In a new experiment that will test this assertion and the
limits of Hughes, the N.Y. Public Service Commission (NYPSC)
has adopted a Clean Energy Standard that will, among other
things, compensate upstate merchant nuclear power plants for
the social cost of carbon that their electricity generation avoids.213
Under the Zero Emission Credit approach applicable to these
plants, the nuclear energy companies operating the relevant
plants will receive payments equivalent to the social cost of
carbon, netting out revenues from the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, for the first two-year period of the Credit.214 This
approach seems to fall on the “safe” side of Hughes because it
makes no reference to the wholesale markets and prices, an
attribute not considered in those markets. In later years,
however, there will also be a price adjustment for wholesale
energy and capacity market revenues.215 Although the NYPSC
was careful to note that it was not setting a price floor for nuclear
power,216 the fact that later compensation directly accounts for
wholesale market revenues is at least worrisome under Hughes.217
Despite the uncertainties created by Hughes, the authors
of this article are optimistic about the general viability of
stranded cost approaches in furtherance of grid decarbonization.
That decarbonization is directed at a value not incorporated into
the wholesale markets means states ought to be able to craft a
variety of approaches without running afoul of Hughes. To the
extent that federal involvement is necessary to address some
213 Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard at 1, Nos. 15-E-0302, 16-E-0270
(N.Y. P.U.C. Aug. 1, 2016). In adopting this approach, New York regulators rejected earlier
proposals that were much more closely tied to wholesale revenues. See Joel B. Eisen, Dual
Electricity Federalism Is Dead, but How Dead, and What Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J.
ENERGY & ENV’T. 1, 19 (2017).
214 Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard at 51, Nos. 15-E-0302, 16-E-0270
(N.Y. P.U.C. Aug. 1, 2016).
215 Id.
216 Id. at 139.
217 For further analysis, see Eisen, supra note 213, at 19–20.

2017]

STRANDED COSTS AND GRID DECARBONIZATION

691

stranded cost issues, we are encouraged that FERC has
experience with such policies just as the states do.
CONCLUSION
Stranded cost recovery for investor risk has played a
central role in energy industry transitions, often helping to
grease the wheels of change. However, as past experiments
with cost recovery show, it also has suffered from myopia that
has delayed some desirable industry transitions and left stranded
important values that firms and energy markets fail to price. The
impending transition to a decarbonized grid cannot ignore these
timing and stranded value issues and thus presents a unique
opportunity to improve energy law’s approach to stranded cost
compensation. As in the past, stranded cost compensation will
prove important (and essential) to the next energy transition, but
it can and should be approached in a manner that overcomes
decarbonization’s obstacles, reassures investors in new
infrastructure without distorting price signals, and recognizes
important energy resource attributes that markets fail to price.

